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ABSTRACT
This Article outlines looming budgetary and accounting issues with federal student
loans and proposes securitization as an innovative mechanism to reform federal
accounting, reduce federal balance sheet risk, and provide a new education quality
indicator. The current federal loan program is unsustainable because it overestimates
the repayment rates and underestimates the cost of certain loan programs.
Securitization will reduce that federal risk. Additionally, by forcing academic
institutions to bear some of the risk, securitization will create a neutral pricing
mechanism outside the direct control of federal regulators to show whether academic
institutions provide a quality education. While complicated, this proposal provides
an innovative, back-end-loaded-solution to introduce risk-based pricing into student
loan programs without placing the risks fully on uninformed students.
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I. INTRODUCTION

W

hat is the purpose of a postsecondary education? Everyone has a
different answer. Academics claim that postsecondary
education enhances a student’s understanding of his or her world.
Politicians believe that postsecondary education creates a better and
more informed society and electorate. Employers use education as a
barrier to entry to sort through potential employees and to verify an
applicant’s skill sets. Students may not even know why they are in
school, only that it is supposed to be the next step on the ladder to a
successful life. But, at the end of the day, higher education is an
investment of resources—time, money, and opportunity cost.1
The question then becomes: who can best determine if an
educational investment is worth the time, the expense, and the effort?
Naturally, the student making the educational choice comes to mind as
the best bearer of risk because he or she knows his or her own
capabilities, desires, and limitations.2 The optimal allocation of risk for
an investment in higher education, however, is complicated because
this type of investment presents a classic example of informational
asymmetry.3
Informational asymmetry is an economic term that describes an
inefficient market caused by one party in a transaction having more
information than the other, which makes it impossible to have rational,
optimal pricing for a product.4 Students, for example, only make an
educational investment once or possibly twice in their lifetime.
Academic institutions, on the other hand, make decisions thousands of
times per semester on whom to enroll, what to teach, and how to
educate students effectively. State and federal regulators also have had
decades of experience reviewing institutional quality and abuses. This
1

2

3

4

See Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 527,
531–32 (2013).
See id. at 590 (asserting that students would benefit from a risk-based system of
student loan pricing as it would force students to internalize the economic risks
when making decisions regarding their education).
See Michael C. Macchiarola & Arun Abraham, Options for Student Borrowers:
A Derivatives-Based Proposal to Protect Students and Control Debt-Fueled
Inflation in the Higher Education Market, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67,
110–11 (2010).
Id. (explaining the economic theory of informational asymmetry by describing
the inherent differences between the law students as the consumers of a legal
education and the law schools and lenders as the sellers of a legal education).
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imbalance of information creates an inefficient market where the
average student makes an uninformed decision about his or her
educational investment. While there have been recent efforts to
promote disclosure to level the information-divide between
participants, students will probably never have the same information as
institutions.
This informational asymmetry creates a bizarre relationship where
an uninformed student makes an education choice that is supported by
federal student loans. As a result the federal government—not the
academic institution—bears the risk of whether the student will have a
favorable outcome from his or her education investment.5 Even though
the federal government has approximately $1 trillion in student loan
debt, its capacity to regulate the quality of academic institutions is
limited. Our current student loan system exposes the federal
government to large risks but fails to provide quality education
indicators to prospective or current students. Any proposal to reform
federal student loan programs should incentivize the fair valuing of
loans on the federal balance sheet, reduce government risk, and
provide a quality education indicator to institutions to adjust their
policies to reduce the risk of bad outcomes from students with
asymmetrical information. Additionally, student loans—not tuition
costs—are the proper focus of reform because the federal government
bears the risk when a student pays his or her tuition with loans.
Securitization is underutilized in federal student loan programs and
could be used to reduce risk and to create a market price for assets.
Securitization is a financial term that refers to the pooling of debt
instruments for sale to third-party investors to offset risks associated
with owning or lending against an asset.6 Securitizing student loans
5

6

This allocation of risk analytically is similar to the inefficient mortgage market
that led to the sub-prime crisis of 2008: homeowners bought houses assuming
successful outcomes, the federal government indirectly was burdened with
homeowners’ mortgage risks through Government Sponsored Enterprises—
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac—and the banks that were responsible for originating
the loans carried little risk. See April A. Wimberg, Comparing the Education
Bubble to the Housing Bubble: Will Universities be Too Big to Fail?, 51 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177, 190–91 (2012).
See Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1373–75 (1991); see
also Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229,
1239–44 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What
Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2012).
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can force accurate accounting for third-party sales, reduce federal debt,
and provide an additional feedback mechanism for academic
institutions and for accreditors to improve education outcomes for
uninformed students. Securitization is only possible if the loans are
valued accurately by the Department of Education (Department)
through fair accounting principles to minimize the losses when the
loans are sold. Once the loans are valued accurately, securitization
provides a method to deleverage government risk through sales to
private investors—there is already current, viable market demand.
Finally, if academic institutions are required to share the losses, or
gains, from securitization—much like originators of asset-backed
securities have risk retention requirements in Dodd-Frank—then
institutions will receive feedback from a third-party market-pricing
mechanism as to whether their educational product is a quality
investment. There have been other efforts to reform student loans in
the past, such as bankruptcy reform,7 but none have focused on reform
through the federal budget—which historically has been the primary
catalyst for policy changes.
This Article analyzes the risks created by federal student loan
programs and proposes changes for reducing or eliminating these risks.
Part II provides a brief history of higher education financing, including
an overview of federal student loan policies as they relate to the
federal budget. Using this budgetary perspective, Part III identifies two
types of government risks that have not been addressed in other
student loan reform proposals: federal accounting and budget risks,
and the risks stemming from the lack of quality education control. Part
IV considers student loan repayment rates as a simplified quality
education indicator and provides a brief history of student loan
securitization. Finally, Part V proposes changes for reducing or
eliminating the risks created by the current federal student loan
programs. Specifically, this Article proposes reforming existing
legislation to more accurately show the riskiness of student loan debt,
securitizing federal student loan assets to reduce government risk, and
creating market-based risk sharing to offset some or all losses from
7

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) (prohibits discharges of student loans in
bankruptcy); Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism: The Case for RiskBased Pricing and Dischargeability, 126 HARV. L. REV. 587, 603 (2012)
[hereinafter Harvard Note] (arguing that repealing § 523(a)(8) would decrease
indebtedness and defaults by permitting the most financially distressed
borrowers to discharge their student loan debt in bankruptcy).

2014

Securitization of Student Loans

11

securitization and to close the feedback loop between students,
accreditors, institutions, and regulators.
II. HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING
Prior to the advent of “federal aid,” extending credit to an
unproven student was a risky proposition. Student loans were
investments in a person’s future-earnings capability or, at the very
least, in his or her ability to repay the loan with no collateral to reduce
the risk of default.8 Universities rarely extended credit to students.
Milton Friedman, in his 1955 essay The Role of Government in
Education, aptly explained this risk and the corresponding
underinvestment in education:
This underinvestment in human capital presumably reflects an
imperfection in the capital market: investment in human beings
cannot be financed on the same terms or with the same ease as
investment in physical capital. It is easy to see why there would be
such a difference. If a fixed money loan is made to finance
investment in physical capital, the lender can get some security for
his loan in the form of a mortgage or residual claim to the physical
asset itself, and he can count on realizing at least part of his
investment in case of necessity by selling the physical asset. If he
makes a comparable loan to increase the earning power of a human
being, he clearly cannot get any comparable security; in a nonslave state, the individual embodying the investment cannot be
9
bought and sold.

This investment uncertainty makes private entities reluctant to
provide student loans. There are grim, actuarial calculations to
consider: the person could fail to complete his or her studies, become
severely disabled, or die.10
Further, a quality education does not translate necessarily into a
successful outcome relative to earnings or employment. A student may
also choose a course of study that makes it difficult to obtain
employment—studying law, the arts, or architecture. Also, even if a
student has an education, he or she may not have the skill sets
necessary to secure employment in an ever-changing business
environment.
8

9
10

MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 85, 102 (Univ. of Chicago Press 40th ed. 2009) (1962).
Id. at 102.
Id.
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For over eight centuries, academic institutions have struggled to
find ways to lend money to students, either through credit
enhancements or government assistance. In 1240, Oxford University
developed the concept of a loan chest, which became widely used in
Europe to assist financially-needy students.11 A student who did not
have enough money to pay for school would deposit an item of
personal property in the loan chest as security in exchange for tuition
for the semester.12 If the student did not pay, then the academic
institution would sell the student’s collateral to recover its loss.13
In the United States, instead of requiring credit enhancements
similar to the collateral required for loan chests, the federal
government more recently has decided to bear the risk of student
loans.14 By bearing the risk of student loans, the government expands
access to higher education and, in theory, receives a greater number of
highly trained, work-ready citizens in return.15
All major shifts in student loan policies have been driven primarily
by their favorable impact to the federal budget. This is true for each of
the following: the switch from direct to guaranteed loans in 1965, the
use of Sallie Mae as a securitizer in 1972, changes to the accounting of
federally-owned loans in 1990, and the switch from guaranteed loans
back to direct loans in 2010. By understanding this historical context,
it becomes possible to evaluate the success of future student loan
reform proposals. Any new reform to student loans must directly
address and resolve budgetary issues to be effective.
A. Post World War II Period
The G.I. Bill after World War II formed the conceptual basis of
federal aid for postsecondary education. Titled the Servicemen’s
Readjustment Act of 1944, the program paid tuition expenses and
11

12
13
14

15

See Middle Ages, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD: FINANCE DIVISION, http://www
.admin.ox.ac.uk/finance/information/history/middleages/ (last visited Feb. 9,
2013) (discussing the establishment of loans chests in 1240).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Simkovic, supra note 1, at 550 (“[T]he U.S. [has] shifted toward a
centralized, taxpayer-funded, and government-coordinated model of universitybased scientific and technical research, coupled with increased education
subsidies.”).
Id. at 532–47 (citing statistical data supporting the theory that education leads to
better employment outcomes).
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living allowances to qualifying veterans when they returned home
after the war.16 The cost of this program was a direct expense to the
federal budget as a grant program. The Department of Veteran Affairs
(VA) approved the eligibility of academic institutions for the program
based on the recommendations of state agencies.17 As would become a
recurring theme in federal funding of higher education, the VA and
other federal entities did not evaluate institutions based on the quality
of education; instead, federal entities relied on the opinions of state
regulators and accreditors.
This delegation of regulatory authority has been referred to
informally as the “triad” of actors—federal agencies, state agencies,
and accreditors—in educational quality assurance.18 This delegation
was formalized in 20 U.S.C. § 1011c, creating the National Advisory
Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI) to
determine standards for accreditation, state licensing, and institutional
eligibility.19 In addition to determining accreditation standards by a
committee, Congress passed 20 U.S.C. § 1232a in 1970 to limit the
federal government’s power in regulating education.20 In part, § 1232a
states, “No provision of any applicable program shall be construed to
authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United
States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the
16

17
18

19

20

Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284, 287–
89 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.); History of the GI
Bill, NAVY PERSONNEL COMMAND, http://www.public.navy.mil/BUPERSNPC/CAREER/EDUCATION/GIBILL/Pages/GIBillHistory.aspx (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013) (discussing the fact that although earlier veteran assistance
programs existed, there was not a large education assistance component until
World War II).
See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 § 400, 58 Stat. at 289.
Report to the U.S. Secretary of Education—Accreditation Policy
Recommendations, NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST. QUALITY AND
INTEGRITY—U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2012-spring/teleconference-2012/naciqi-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Higher Education Accreditation].
20 U.S.C. § 1011c(a), (c) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-177, at 19 (2011)
(discussing the “triad” regulatory structure in higher education and
Congressional delegation of the regulation of the quality of education to
accreditors).
See Robert S. Eitel & Kent D. Talbert, The Road to a National Curriculum: The
Legal Aspects of the Common Core Standards, Race to the Top, and Conditional
Waivers, 13 ENGAGE 13, 13 (2012), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120216
_EitelTalbertEngage13.1.pdf (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2012)).
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curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any
educational institution . . . .”21 This current statute was based on
similar language created at the inception of federal aid in higher
education in 1958.22
In essence, the Department cannot regulate the quality of education
because Congress has delegated that power to third-party accreditors
and state regulators.23 This forms the framework for federal oversight
and explains why the Department has limited power to restrict
institutional access to financial aid funds based on the quality of
education.
B. Congress Expands Student Loan Funding
Congress further developed this concept of federal aid for
postsecondary education through the National Defense Education Act
of 1958 (NDEA).24 This was the precursor to the Perkins Loan
Program.25 Unlike the G.I. Bill, the NDEA provided assistance
regardless of a student’s military or veteran status.26 It provided low
interest loans to students who studied math and science27 to improve
the United States’ competitiveness in the space race.28

21
22

23

24

25

26

27
28

Id.
See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 102, 72
Stat. 1580, 1582 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232a).
H.R. REP. NO. 112-177, at 19 (“Because of concern about federal interference in
school operations, curriculum, and instruction, the Department of
Education . . . has relied on accrediting agencies and States to determine and
enforce standards of program quality.”).
See National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
See id. (forming the loan program for qualifying students studying science and
engineering, later relabeled the Perkins Loan Program); Higher Education
Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 461, 106 Stat. 448, 576 (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087aa (2012)).
Congress recognized that promoting science would benefit national defense. See
National Defense Education Act of 1958 § 101, 72 Stat. at 1581.
See National Defense Education Act of 1958 §§ 204, 205, 72 Stat. at 1584–86.
See generally Roger Roots, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in
Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 504 (2000) (“The first federal
student loan program was enacted as a national defense measure.”).
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The loan portion of the NDEA was accounted in the federal budget
as a direct expense in the year the funds were disbursed.29 For
example, if the loan was $100 at 3% interest, the government booked a
$100 cost on its budget the year the funds were disbursed and then
booked revenues as they were repaid. This method of cash basis
accounting, which was standard for the federal government at the time,
made it prohibitively expensive to provide student loans to students
because it had the same budgetary treatment as a grant program.30
The problem with the NDEA program was that it required
Congress to appropriate large initial funds in the budget, on an
ongoing basis, to pay for the disbursement of loans—even when
officials were reasonably sure that the programs would eventually cost
much less as a result of repayments. For example, if 10 students each
have a $100 loan—for a total of $1000 in loans— then the cost to the
government would be $1000 during the first year. However, assuming
an interest rate of 3% and no defaults, the actual return after 10 years
would be around $1350. Thus, the $1000 budgetary cost in the first
year would become a surplus of $350 at the end of the tenth year.
Public policy officials realized that a different funding approach was
needed to expand access and reduce costs.
Congress and the Johnson administration found their budgetary
work-around in the Higher Education Act of 1965. This act served as
the turning point where the federal government opened financial aid to
all students regardless of their area of study or previous military
service.31 The Act sought to expand access to higher education through
programs of grants and loans,32 such as the Guaranteed Student Loan
Program (GSLP). This provided an innovative compromise as a gapfiller for any student’s financial need beyond grants while also
29

30

31

32

Federal Student Loan Programs History, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION,
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programshistory (last visited May 15, 2013).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO HRD-91-144BR, STUDENT LOANS:
DIRECT LOANS COULD SAVE MONEY AND SIMPLIFY PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
2 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 GAO REPORT].
See Higher Education Act of 1965 Pub L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070 –1099e
(2012).
See Higher Education Act of 1965 Pub L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219; id. at §401
(creating the Educational Opportunity Grant Program); id. at §421 (creating the
Guaranteed Student Loan Program).
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minimizing its financial impact to the budget. The GSLP was renamed
the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program when the Higher
Education Act was reauthorized in 1992.33
The GSLP provided federal government guarantees on loans made
to students by non-government lenders; the government did not
directly loan the funds.34 When this program was created, any loan
directly owned by the government was required to be placed on the
balance sheet as an expense until repaid.35 A 1991 Government
Accountability Office report explains the budgetary rational for
adopting this approach:
A direct loan’s cost was equivalent to the outlay for loan principal.
Subsequent defaults and repayments were accounted for in the year
they occurred, not when the loan was made. As a result of this
accounting method, direct loans appeared much more expensive
36
than guaranteed loans.

Thus, the GSLP was developed to mitigate the program costs in the
federal budget while also incentivizing private lenders to make loans
to students.37
The Educational Opportunity Grant Program, which also was
considered a direct expense, was created in 1965 to provide grants to
students with financial need.38 This program was later renamed the
Federal Pell Grant Program after Senator Claiborne Pell from Rhode
Island because of his focus on higher education reform during the
1960s and 1970s.39 At the time it was passed in 1965, the grant
33

34

35

36
37
38
39

See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 411(a), 106
Stat. 448, 510 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1071(c)).
See Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 97 (noting that under the FFEL
Program, the federal government provided subsidies to lenders for originating
federal student loans); see also DEP’T OF EDUC., STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW—
FISCAL 2012 BUDGET REQUEST S-3, S-4 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/overview/budget/budget12/justifications/s-loansoverview.pdf
[hereinafter
STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW].
See Federal Student Loan History, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://febp
.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-history
(last visited May 15, 2013).
1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 2.
Id.
See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1178, at 15 (1965).
William H. Hohan, Claiborne Pell, Ex-Senator, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 1,
2009, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/us/politics
/02pell.html.
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program improved access to education but also was expensive to the
federal budget at cost of $70 million per year.40 In fact, for fiscal year
2012, the Office of Federal Student Aid disbursed over $33 billion in
Pell Grants to students.41
As discussed in Part I, private lenders generally do not provide
loans to students because of the uncertainty that results from an
inability to secure an interest to reduce risk.42 To get lenders to
participate in the GSLP, the government provided two separate
subsidies or credit enhancements. First, the government provided
guarantees against loss of principal in the event of a default.43 Second,
the government insulated lenders from market risk by guaranteeing
lenders a set rate of return on interest.44 From a budgetary standpoint,
the government only had to budget for a fraction of the cost of the
actual loan, which allowed the government to quickly expand the
program.45 It is important, however, to point out that this risk exposure
was not capped and the government was still vulnerable to bad
outcomes. For instance, if more students than estimated could not
repay the interest or defaulted on loans, the annual risk-to-cost ratio to
the federal government would increase as well.
The GSLP expanded a state-by-state non-profit cottage industry for
student loans, which already provided loans to students through state
programs.46 Even with the credit enhancements from the federal
government through the GSLP, the industry was fragmented, and it
constantly struggled for more capital to make loans to students.47 To
40
41

42
43

44
45
46

47

See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1178, at 64.
DEP’T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2012 8 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about
/reports/annual/2012report/fsa-report.pdf [hereinafter FSA 2012 BUDGET].
See Friedman, supra note 8, at 102.
Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 97 & n.142 (“[I]f a borrower defaults
on a FFEL loan, the government pays the lender ninety-seven percent of the
outstanding principal . . . while the lender assumes default risk for only the
remaining three percent of the loan principal.” (citation omitted)).
Id. at 97 & n.143.
1991 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 2.
See Bradley J. B. Toben & Carolyn P. Osolinik, Nonprofit Student Lenders and
Risk Retention: How the Dodd-Frank Act Threatens Students’ Access to Higher
Education and the Viability of Nonprofit Student Lenders, 64 BAYLOR L. REV.
158, 178–79 (2012).
MARK WOLFE, Legislative History of Student Loan Marketing Association,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. CRS-1 (May 17, 1982) (“[Graduate Student Loan
(GSL)] lenders, many of whom had accumulated relatively large portfolios of
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alleviate this pressure and to accelerate funding, the federal
government formed Sallie Mae in 1972.48
When it was created, Sallie Mae was a government sponsored
enterprise (GSE) similar to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Its purpose
was to buy existing loans from non-profits—thus returning capital to
lenders to make more loans—and package the loans into securitized
investments similar to bonds.49 This pooling mechanism enabled
investors to invest in diversified risk pools of student loans and
enabled lenders to capitalize loan assets instead of waiting ten years
for repayment. Additionally, because of the principal guarantees from
the GSLP, the loans could be sold and securitized at relative par value
irrespective of actual loan risk. This securitization process is similar to
mortgage origination.50 GSEs and securitization are discussed in
greater detail in Part IV. The combination of federal credit
enhancements and GSE liquidity stabilized and expanded the market
for student loans in higher education.
To further leverage this privatized system of student loans,
Congress expanded funding for guaranteed loans to almost all students
when it removed strict income requirements for loans in the Middle
Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA) in 1978.51 MISAA helped
the federal government increase funding by 39% to $3 billion in
1979.52 As stated above, this budgetary expense only covered the
estimated guarantee-cost to the federal government from private loans.
Using a 2005 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study as a reference
point, a guaranteed loan of $100 would have a subsidization cost to the

48

49
50

51

52

student loans, became increasing reluctant to commit additional funds for GSLs
because of their relative lack of liquidity, long repayment schedules, and
relatively high servicing costs.”).
Id. (citing Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 439(b)(1), 86
Stat. 235, 265 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)).
See Wolfe, supra note 47, at CRS-1.
See Wimberg, supra note 5, at 190–91 (discussing the similarities between the
current student loan origination process and the mortgage origination process).
See Middle Income Student Assistance Act (MISAA), Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92
Stat. 2402 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL STUDENT ASSISTANCE: ISSUE AND OPTIONS 35
(March 1980), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/111xx
/doc11178/80doc12.pdf.
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Department’s budget of roughly $15, or a 15% subsidization rate.53
This freed up more capital in the annual budget to make additional
student loans because a $100 loan now only cost the federal
government roughly $15 through subsidized guarantees in the budget.
Thus, $100 budgeted for student loan costs in the federal budget could
be leveraged to roughly $666 in loans to students.54 In sum, the
government favored the GSLP as a way to reduce direct costs in the
federal budget and expand access to student loans.
C. Policy Issues Concerning Government Backed Loans
The new expansion of unsecured student loans also raised policy
concerns from debt discharges in bankruptcies in the 1970s. Rumors of
students purposefully taking on high levels of debt and then
discharging that debt in bankruptcy proceedings pushed Congress to
act in the late 1970s.55 Congress required students to prove “undue
hardship” in order to discharge recent loans.56 Most courts interpreted
undue hardship as a difficult standard to meet.57 While this policy was
53

54

55
56

57

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SUBSIDY ESTIMATES FOR GUARANTEED AND DIRECT
LOAN PROGRAMS 11 (2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/ftpdocs/68xx/doc6874/11-16-studentloans.pdf [hereinafter CBO SUBSIDY
ESTIMATES].
These estimates using the 2005 subsidization rate of 15% are only to illustrate
how loan costs impact the federal budget and how the estimated subsidy rate
reduces the annual budget costs per loan (or increases the amount available to be
loaned). As stated above, $100 at a 15% subsidization rate; $100 / .15 = $666.66
loans available for a government cost of $100. See generally, Student Loans
Overview – Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Proposal, Dep’t of Educ., S-11,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget14/justifications/s-loans
overview.pdf [hereinafter 2014 Department of Education Budget Proposal].
Simkovic, supra note 1, at 612–13.
Id. at 613 (citing Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational
Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 420–21 (2005)).
See, e.g., Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner),
831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court’s
ruling that the bankruptcy court had discharged the appellant’s student loan in
error on the grounds that the appellant had failed to establish “additional
circumstances” beyond an inability to pay and thus was ineligible for a
discharge based on “undue hardship”); see also Simkovic, supra note 1, at 612–
13 (citing Pardo & Lacey, supra note 56, at 185); Brendan Hennessy, Comment,
The Partial Discharge of Student Loans: Breaking Apart the All or Nothing
Interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(8), 77 TEMP. L. REV. 71, 78 (2004) (noting
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meant to prevent bad actors from abusing the student loan system, it
also functioned as a way to improve the credit-worthiness of student
loans through improved collections rights.58 Thus, these unsecured
loans became more secure than credit card debt or personal loans. This
favorable impact to the credit-worthiness of federal loans helps explain
why it originally passed and why it has not changed despite numerous
pushes for reform.
The Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) of 1990 drastically
changed the accounting treatment of student loans in the federal
budget by switching all federally owned loans from cash basis
accounting to accrual accounting.59 In 1989, a CBO study about credit
reform for accounting policies explained why guaranteed loans were
preferred to direct loans because of differences in accounting
treatments: “The difference in the budgetary treatment between direct
loans and guaranteed loans creates a bias in favor of guarantees
because their costs are deferred.”60 The previous cash basis treatment
was the primary reason Congress switched in 1965 from direct loan
programs61 through the National Defense Education Act, now the
Perkins Loan Program,62 to the Guaranteed Loan Program, now the
FFEL Program.63 The FCRA defines the cost of a direct loan through a
net-present-value—discounted
cash
flow—calculation.64
This
essentially allows an agency to account for the expected return or cost
at the time of the disbursement, thus reducing the budgetary impact for

58

59

60

61

62
63
64

that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted the standards articulated in Brunner
for determining “undue hardship”).
Simkovic, supra note 1, at 609; see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU,
PRIVATE
STUDENT
LOAN
REPORT,
70–71
(2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans
.pdf.
See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. V, 104 Stat.
1388-610 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 661a–661f (2012)); see also CBO
SUBSIDY ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at 10.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CREDIT REFORM: COMPARABLE BUDGET COSTS FOR
CASH AND CREDIT xii (1989), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/ftpdocs/67xx/doc6758/89-cbo-031.pdf.
Federal Student Loan Programs History, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION,
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programshistory (last visited May 15, 2013).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1087aa–1087ii (2012).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1087-4.
2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A) (2012).
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that year. This calculation and the ways in which it impacts the budget
are discussed in Part IV.
The FCRA’s change to accrual accounting allowed policy officials
from both political parties to re-evaluate direct loan programs in order
to simplify the loan process and reduce loan costs to the budget.
Congress, with support from President George H. W. Bush’s
administration, created a pilot program for direct loans as result of the
FCRA accounting treatment change.65 While small in size, it allowed
the Department to book favorably the expected return on investment at
the time of the disbursement. In his first year of office, President
Clinton converted this pilot program into what is now called the Direct
Loan Program.66
While it was clear that the Direct Loan Program reduced budgetary
costs, the program had limited success during the 1990s and early
2000s. During that time, direct loans initially rose to 35% but
eventually fell to roughly 25% of all federal student loans.67 The
program was under-utilized because institutions could choose between
FFEL and Direct Loan programs and Republican lawmakers favored
FFEL programs by providing favorable terms for loan guarantee
payments.68 Additionally, private lenders and financial aid officers of
universities were accused of being involved in kickback schemes to
funnel students to private and FFEL loans as opposed to direct loans.69
In 2007, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA)
diminished the FFEL program by changing the financial compensation

65

66
67
68
69

See A History of Direct Loans, FEDERAL STUDENT AID—DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dlfsheets/doc0006_bodyoftext.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2013); see also Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325,
§ 451, 106 Stat. 448, 569–76; Robert Shireman, Straight Talk on Student Loans,
CTR. FOR STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUC.—U. CAL. BERKELEY 5 (2004), http://cshe
.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ROP.Shireman.Loans.10.04.pdf
(“Congress,
prompted by a memo leaked from the Bush administration that indicated direct
loans would be less costly and simpler to administer than guaranteed loans,
responded by creating a pilot program of direct student loans.”).
See Shireman, supra note 65, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7.
See Special Report: Student Loan Scandal, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
http://education.newamerica.net/special_report_student_loan_scandal
(last
visited May 15, 2013) (providing a comprehensive list of news articles,
investigative studies and opinion pieces from 2006 to 2008).
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for private lenders and servicers.70 It reduced the amount of principal
guaranteed by the government and also reduced the fees and interest
rate subsidies to lenders.71 The result of this policy was to make FFEL
loans less profitable to private lenders, which correspondingly reduced
the market of student loan lenders. The financial crisis demonstrated
weaknesses in the FFEL program because of its dependence on private
lenders to provide capital for student loans.72 In the fall of 2008, banks
and other lenders were having trouble finding enough capital to lend to
students for the fall semester.73
To recapitalize the lenders, President George W. Bush and
Congress enacted the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loan Act
of 2008 (ECASLA) to buy FFEL loans from private lenders.74
Congress granted authority to the Department, which utilized complex
financial structures, such as put-options and asset buying conduits, to
repurchase interests in approximately $100 billion of FFEL loans.75
This amounted to a cash infusion by the government into the FFEL
loan market to provide the needed capital to continue disbursing
loans.76 This raised serious questions about the rationale of using
private capital in the first place if bankers could not find funds for
federally guaranteed student loans.77

70

71
72

73
74

75
76
77

See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784
(2007) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. NO.
110-317, at 45–47 (2007) (summarizing the changes to the FFEL program for
interest rates and increased origination fees).
H.R. REP. NO. 110-317, at 45–47.
See Jason Delisle, Student Loan Purchase Programs Under the Ensuring
Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 1
(Dec. 2009), http://education.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policy
docs/Student_Loan_Purchase_Programs_Under_ECASLA.pdf
[hereinafter
ECASLA Programs].
Id.
See U.S. DEPT. ED., ENSURING CONTINUED ACCESS TO STUDENT LOANS ACT OF
2008 (ECALSA): ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2011), http://studentaid.ed
.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/July2011ECASLAReport.pdf;
Ensuring Continued Access To Student Loans Act Of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110227, 122 Stat. 740 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
ECASLA Programs, supra note 72, at 3.
Id. at 1.
Imagine the doomsday scenario where students cannot get loans to pay for
tuition and universities do not receive funds. That would remove tens of billions
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The CCRAA also planted two seeds that have laid the foundation
for alleviating student loan debt: the Income-Based Repayment
(IBR)78 and Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF)79 programs. IBR
allows any student after 2009 with direct or FFEL loans to pay only
15% of their discretionary income towards the monthly payment and
extends the term of the loan to 25 years.80 If there is a balance after 25
years, then that debt is cancelled and fully booked as income in the
year of cancellation.81 PSLF forgives only direct loan debt if the
student works full-time at a qualifying public service job for 120
months—ten years.82 A student can utilize the IBR plan for those ten
years to reduce the monthly payment obligation and the forgiveness
bypasses any taxable income from cancelled debt.83
Neither of these concepts were new to federal aid programs. The
Student Loan Reform Act of 1993 offered an income contingent
repayment plan.84 The original NDEA program from 1958 also had
loan forgiveness provisions for public school teachers.85 The CCRAA,
however, simplified the requirements and expanded the number of
people who could qualify for these programs. These changes were
possible because the federal government owned the loans from the
Direct Loan Program and had broader discretion to change the
repayment conditions. As discussed later, this is a powerful public
policy tool that provides great flexibility but also raises significant
risks to predicting the long-term cost of federal student loans.

78

79
80
81
82
83

84

85

of dollars from the economy in one fell swoop and probably cause debt defaults
or bankruptcies for some universities.
College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 493C, 121 Stat.
784, 792–95 (2007).
College Cost Reduction and Access Act § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 800–01.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 682.215(b)(1) (2013).
See I.R.C. § 108 (2013) (income provision for the cancellation of debt).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219.
FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID—U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN
FORGIVENESS Q & AS FOR BORROWERS 1 (2012), http://www.studentaid.ed.gov
/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgiveness-common-questions.pdf.
Student Loan Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 455(e), 107 Stat. 341,
349–50 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087e (2012)).
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, STUDENT LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAMS CRS-1
(April 1, 2005), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32516_20040809.pdf.
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D. Current Programs
1. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010
With the ECASLA program fresh in the background, President
Obama and Congress enacted the Student Aid and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 2010 (SAFRA),86 which was a significant
change in student loan policy. Under SAFRA, the Department was
required to eliminate FFEL programs by 2010 and replace all federal
student loans with the Direct Loan Program.87 Citing the FCRA
accounting changes as the basis for its analysis, the CBO stated that
this change to only direct lending would save the federal budget “$28
billion over the 2010–2014 period and $58 billion over the 2010–2019
period.”88
More recently, the CBO estimated savings for fiscal years 2013
and 2014 of $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively.89 In addition to
this change to direct lending, the government further expanded the
PLSF and IBR programs enacted in 2007. The Pay As You Earn
(PAYE) option reduced the IBR monthly payment to only 10% of
discretionary income and shortened the repayment period to twenty
instead of twenty-five years for new borrowers after October 1, 2007.90
These payment changes were possible because they were tied to the
savings from the switch to direct lending. The Direct Loan Program
comprised about 30% of all student loans at the time SAFRA was

86

87

88

89

90

Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, tit.
II, sub. A, 124 Stat. 1071 (2010).
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OFFICE, THE SAFRA ACT: EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN
THE FY2010 BUDGET RECONCILIATION 1–2 (2010), http://www.aacc.nche.edu
/Advocacy/Documents/CRS%20SAFRA.pdf.
Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, 6 (Mar. 20, 2010),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379
/amendreconprop.pdf (filed on CBO website).
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO FEBRUARY 2013 BASELINE PROJECTIONS FOR THE
STUDENT LOAN PROGRAM Table 1 (2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files
/cbofiles/attachments/43913_StudentLoans.pdf.
See generally 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087e(m) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2013); 34
C.F.R. 685.209(a)(1)(iii) (New borrowers are defined as any student that did not
have outstanding loans before October 1, 2007 which received any Direct Loan
disbursements after October 1, 2011).
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enacted, and the program rapidly expanded.91 During fiscal year 2012,
the Department loaned $142 billion exclusively through direct loans.92
2. Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013
In a rare act of bipartisanship, Congress passed the Bipartisan
Student Loan Certainty Act (SLCA) in August 2013.93 The legislation
was signed into law by President Obama on August 9, 2013, and was
retroactively effective on July 1, 2013.94 This legislation changed the
interest rates of student loans from statutorily set interest rates of
6.8%, for undergraduates and Stafford Graduate loans, and 7.9%, for
parent loans and Plus loans for graduates, to a more flexible fixed rate
based on the market rate of 10-Year Treasury Notes sold that year. The
following chart compares the impact of the new legislation to previous
loan rates:
Before SLCA95
Rates
SLCA Cap on
SLCA Rate96
(2006-2013)
2013-201497 Fixed Rate98
6.8%
2.05% + 10Undergraduate
(3.4% from
3.86%
8.25%
Year Rate
2011–2013)
Graduate
3.6% + 10Student
6.8%
5.41%
9.5%
Year Rate
Stafford
PLUS Loans
4.6% + 10(Graduate &
7.9%
6.41%
10.5%
Year Rate
Parent)
91

92

93
94
95
96
97

98

Student Loans Overview, supra note 34, at S-13 (New Student Loan Volume
During 2009).
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL
REPORT 57 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/2012report/agency
-financial-report.pdf. This number includes consolidations through SAFRA,
without the consolidations the government disbursed $105 billion to 11 million
students. FSA 2012 BUDGET, supra note 41, at 9.
See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7)–(8).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8).
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(7).
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8).
Calculators & Interest Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.—FEDERAL STUDENT AID,
http://www.direct.ed.gov/calc.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8).
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The legislation was a response to the return of higher
undergraduate interest rates, previously set at 3.4% from July 2011 to
July 2013, to 6.8%.99 The immediate effect was to lower the interest
rates for all new disbursements during the 2013–2014 academic year.
The SLCA also introduced market-pricing to student loans by allowing
the possibility for interest rates to go up to 8.25% for undergraduates,
9.5% for some graduate loans, and 10.5% for parent and some
graduate loans.100 The interest rate cap of 8.25% for loan consolidation
was removed to allow for the potentially higher market-based rates on
loans in the future.101 In essence, the SCLA reduced the long-term risk
of inflation—i.e., increased Treasury Note rates—for student loans
originated by the federal government while also providing a short-term
reduction in interest rates for current students. The SLCA required the
Government Accountability Office to perform a detailed study to
determine “the actual cost to the Federal Government of carrying out
the Federal student loan programs.”102 The law also requires a separate
cost breakdown of loan administrative costs, interest rates, and other
terms.103
Despite the relatively short history of federal student loans, two
policy trends are evident. First, the method of lending money to
students is predicated almost entirely on the budgetary treatment of the
program. The FFEL program was created in the Higher Education
Amendments of 1965 to reduce the budgetary impact of NDEA loans
to expand access to more students at a lower cost. The Direct Loan
Program of 1993 was only created after the accounting changes of
FCRA in 1990. President Obama’s push for an exclusive Direct Loan
Program, with its flexible repayment plans, was due primarily to the
program’s positive impact on the budget.104 SLCA reduced current
99

100
101
102

103
104

See Equal Justice Works, Student Loan Act Could Mean Higher Federal Profits,
U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/studentloan-ranger/2013/08/14/student-loan-act-could-mean-higher-federal-profits; 20
U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(7)(D)(v).
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8).
§ 1087e(b)(8)(D).
See Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127
Stat. 506, § 4.
Id.
Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Signs Overhaul of Student Loan
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/us
/politics/31obama.html. See generally Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test:
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interest rates for students by allowing increases in the future based on
market-based rates.105 Second, the government fills an important
need—not met by private lenders because of risk—by providing loans
to students either directly or through credit enhancements to prevent
underinvestment of human capital.106
Based on this historical analysis, any discussion about reforming
student loans must revolve around its impact to the budget. If policy
makers want to change student loan policies, they must change how
such programs are accounted through FCRA and make adjustments to
risk analysis.
III. GOVERNMENT RISKS
There are two general policy issues confronting current student
loan programs. First, the loan programs have placed an inordinate
amount of risk with the federal government. The programs have
burdened the federal balance sheet with roughly $1 trillion in risky
student loan debt. For the annual budget, the programs inaccurately
reduce costs through inflated negative subsidies107 that do not fully
encompass the true cost of the lending programs. Second, the federal
government, through the triad of quality education regulators and
failed Gainful Employment Regulations,108 has been incapable of
closing the educational quality feedback loop between uninformed

105

106
107

108

Why Congress Should Allow College Students to Borrow More Through Federal
Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 58–59 (2011) (asserting
that direct funding from the federal government would allow the government to
retain control over the loans and institute flexibility in the repayment options).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(8) (tying interest rates for various loans to the ten-year
treasury bond rate plus an additional percentage).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 102.
The term “negative subsidy” is used in the federal budget to describe a program
that returns more money to the program than the cost allocated. Hence, a real
subsidy is the actual budgetary cost of a program to the federal government
whereas a negative subsidy is the amount added to the federal budget from the
program. In layman terms, a negative subsidy is the fictional “profit” from the
program which can be used to offset other costs, such as increased Pell Grants.
See generally, 2014 Department of Education Budget Proposal, supra note 54 at
S-11.
Gainful Employment Regulations encompass the regulations set forth by the
Secretary of Education so that educational institutions can receive federal funds.
See generally 34 C.F.R. § 668.8 (2013) (providing reporting regulations for
schools regarding gainful employment statistics).
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students, federal student loans, and academic institutions that bear
minimal risk for such loans. This transfers the risk of providing a
quality education to the federal government even though the
government is restricted in its ability to regulate academic institutions
for quality.
Legal scholars109 aptly have outlined other problems with student
loan programs, such as students being burdened with greater student
loan debt as a result of higher tuition costs.110 This increase in tuition
costs is prevalent especially in the for-profit sector of higher
education.111 While there are many factors at play, this increase can be
attributed to inadequate incentives for institutions to control their
program costs. Former U.S. Department of Education Secretary
William Bennett proffered a similar explanation for the continued
tuition increases.112 He suggested that federal aid allows tuition
109

110

111

112

See, e.g., Wimberg, supra note 5, at 194 (citing Daniel L. Bennett, New College
Loan Rules Put Taxpayers at Risk, FORBES.COM (May 10, 2010, 6:00 PM),
http:// www.forbes.com/2010/05/10/student-loans-safra-leadership-educationbennett.html) (taxpayer investment in the financial aid programs are failing to
produce societal benefits); Roots, supra note 28, at 511–12 (stating that few
people would deny that federal aid is directly responsible for the rising costs of
college education).
See Tuition Costs of Colleges and Universities, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76 (last visited Apr. 5,
2013).
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded
Subprime Higher Education, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 457–58 (2012)
(citations omitted) (noting that students who attend for-profit colleges are
burdened with higher debts and default rates than those students who attend
public or nonprofit institutions); Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal
Reform of the For-Profit Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515, 528–29
(2012) (citations omitted) (highlighting the exploitive practices engaged in by
for-profit institutions coupled with the for-profit students’ heightened loan debt
and diminished employment prospects).
William J. Bennett, Opinion, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/18/opinion/our-greedy-colleges.html?page
wanted=all&src=pm (“If anything, increases in financial aid in recent years have
enabled colleges and universities [to blithely] raise their tuitions, confident that
Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the increase.”). But see generally
ANDREW GILLEN, FINANCIAL AID IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY IT IS
INEFFECTIVE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2009), http://www.centerfor
collegeaffordability.org/uploads/Financial_Aid_in_Theory_and_Practice%281
%29.pdf (critiquing William Bennett’s theory as too broad because it treats all
federal financial aid as equal causes of rising tuition costs).
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inflation to occur because the federal government provides aid in the
form of grants and loans to match the costs of education and the
institutions have little incentive to rein in costs.113 In other words,
there is a break down in incentives to institutions because they do not
substantially bear the risk of unsuccessful educational outcomes for
students such as when the student does not repay the debt. While there
are other problems with student loans, budget risks and closing this
feedback loop on educational quality require further examination to
produce successful reforms in which all actors in higher education will
have similarly aligned incentives for positive educational outcomes.
A. Federal Accounting and Budget Risks
This section will address in greater detail how the federal budget
currently impacts student loan policy and, conversely, how student
loans may impact the budget. This section will analyze the following:
(1) how accrual accounting impacts the federal budget and its potential
pitfalls; (2) two looming issues for financial aid: fair-value accounting
and impending costs or write-downs; and (3) how to reduce accounting
and write-down risks through changes in public policy.
The current federal structure for student loans differs from most
government assistance programs. By more than a two-to-one margin,
the government has preferred loan guarantee programs over direct
ownership of loan obligations.114 The government provides loan
guarantees in the following markets: residential mortgages through
FHA loans and VA loans; small businesses through SBA loans; and
various loan programs for international trade.115 Of the direct loans
and guarantees programs, student loans have the largest percentage of
negative subsidies due to the way the costs are calculated through
FCRA.116 In fiscal year 2012, student loans from the Direct Loan
Program comprised 78% of all credit receivables—$673 billion out of

113

114

115
116

See Bennet, supra note 112; see also William S. Howard, The Student Loan
Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law School, 7 J. OF L. ECON. & POLICY 485,
496–97 (2011) (describing higher education as an inelastic good which is not
effected by price increases).
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, 2012 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 67–
68 (2012), http://www.fms.treas.gov/fr/12frusg/12frusg.pdf [hereinafter 2012
U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT].
Id.
Id.

30

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 6

$859 billion—on the federal balance sheet.117 In the same year, the
number of student loans managed by the federal government ballooned
to $948 billion118 with loans to 38 million individuals. 119 These loans
are considered an asset on the federal balance sheet with the estimated
repayments comprising roughly 30% of the federal government’s
assets.120 Student loans, once an afterthought with restricted funding,
are now the focus of fiscal and public policy debates because of their
impact on the overall federal budget.
1. Accrual Accounting & Fair-Value Estimates for Direct
Loans
As stated in Part II, the most significant recent change in federal
student aid was the FCRA, which mandated accrual accounting for
credit programs.121 The FCRA requires the government to record the
lifetime cost of federal credit programs, such as federal student loans,
on an up-front accrual basis.122 For the purposes of budgeting the cost
of student loans, this means that the Department must estimate the
long-term costs of the loan when it is first disbursed.123 The FCRA
defines the cost for a federal credit program, such as a student loan, as
the “estimated long-term cost to the Government of a direct loan or
loan guarantee . . . calculated on net present value basis, excluding
administrative costs and any incidental effects on governmental
receipts or outlays.”124
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Id.
FSA 2012 Budget, supra note 41, at 77.
Id. at 9.
2012 U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 114, at iv.
See Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. V, 104 Stat.
1388-610 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 661(a)–(f) (2012)); Federal
Student Loan Cost Estimates, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, http://febp
.newamerica.net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-cost-estimates (last
visited Nov. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Federal Student Loan Estimates].
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF FEDERAL
CREDIT PROGRAMS IN 2013 2 (2012), http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/attachments/FairValue_One-Col.pdf.
James M. Bickley, Budgetary Treatment of Federal Credit (Direct Loans and
Loan Guarantees): Concepts, History, and Issues for the 112th Congress, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. 1 (Jul. 27, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42632.pdf.
2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A) (2012).
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This is a form of accrual accounting in two ways: (1) the
government estimates on a regular basis its expected future payments
minus doubtful accounts; and (2) the estimated loss/gain is discounted
to a present value based on a discount rate. The estimated cost is then
translated into the annual budget as a subsidy. If the estimated loan
payments are more than the estimated cost, then this is referred to in
the federal budget as a negative subsidy.125 Currently, for every $1
loaned to a student, the federal government expects to receive $1.32 in
repayment, $.32 of which is a negative subsidy.126 Below is a list
created by the CBO and compiled by the New America Foundation of
subsidy cost estimates for fiscal year 2013 showing an overall negative
subsidy of $36.5 billion:127
Federal Student Loan Volume and Subsidy Cost Estimates,
Fiscal Year 2013128
Subsidy
Rate

New Volume
(billions)

Costs
(billions)

Subsidized Stafford Loans

-15.1%

$30.4

-$4.6

Unsubsidized Stafford Loans

-33.8%

$60.9

-$20.6

GradPLUS Loans

-57.8%

$9.1

-$5.3

Parent PLUS Loans

-49.8%

$12.3

-$6.1

Total

-32.4%

$112.7

-$36.5

Loan Type

125

126

127
128

STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW, supra note 34, at S-7 (“A negative subsidy occurs
when the present value of cash inflows to the Government is estimated to exceed
the present value of cash outflows. In that case, the Federal Government is
earning more than it is spending.”).
Federal Student Loan Estimates, supra note 121; see also Memorandum from
Congressional Budget Office titled March 2012 Baseline Budget Account
Totals, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Mar. 13, 2012), http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files
/cbofiles/attachments/43054_StudentLoanPellGrantPrograms.pdf.
Federal Student Loan Estimates, supra note 121.
Id.

32

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 6

The FCRA calculation also discounts the future cash flows into
present dollar terms. A net present value calculation is based on the
theory that money today is more valuable than money in the future;
thus, future cash flows are discounted to compensate for the cost of
borrowing, riskiness of the investment, and other factors.129 Under the
FCRA, the present value of future cash flows can be calculated in the
following way:
Present Value130 = Total Future Payments /
(1 + Discount Rate )(Number of Years)
Discount Rate = Average Interest Rate on Marketable
Treasury Securities of Similar Maturity131
(i.e., 10-year Treasury Notes at roughly 2%)
Future Payments = Estimated Payment of Principal, Interest
Accrued, Penalties, Fees, and Doubtful
Accounts (losses)132
Not Included: Market Risk of Loans,133 or Administrative Costs
(including collections costs) of loan programs134
To make this calculation, the Department fills the variables in the
above net present value formula based on the loan amount, the
expected repayment of principal, and the interest and other payments
over the life of the loan—penalties, fees, or defaults.135 Agencies must
recalculate these estimates on a regular basis.136
The accounting treatment and net present value calculations have
been extensively covered by the CBO, the Congressional Research
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

CBO SUBSIDY ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at 10.
See Bickley, supra note 123, at 18.
2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(E) (2012).
See id. at § 661a(5)(B).
See Bickley, supra note 123.
2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A).
See id. § 661a(5)(B).
See id. § 661c (“There is hereby provided permanent indefinite authority for
these reestimates.”).
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Service (CRS), and the New America Foundation.137 Based on their
research, federal interest rates are the primary reason for negative
subsidies for student loans.138 A CRS Report explained the primary
reason for the subsidy: “This high negative subsidy level was due
primarily to the use of Treasury interest rates to discount future credit
flows.”139 In other words, the government is borrowing money at
historically low levels from the Treasury Department and then
charging interest on its student loans at rates ranging from 3.4% to
7.9%, plus fees. This kind of arbitrage has greatly reduced the
budgetary cost of student loans.
Instead of using the treasury rate for the discount rate, experts have
pushed for assigning a discount rate based on the market risk of the
loans—in other words, the risk of default.140 The inclusion of the
administrative costs for servicing loans would also reduce the negative
subsidy and more accurately reflect the cost of the programs.141 These
reforms to the FCRA formula sometimes are referred to as Fair-Value
Estimates.142 Republican House Representatives have unsuccessfully
attempted to reform the FCRA in the 2014 Budget by proposing the
adoption of fair-value accounting principles.143 The SLCA further
demonstrated this push for fair-value accounting for federal student
loans by using market-based interest rates and commissioning a
Government Accountability Office study to provide an accurate
estimate of student loan costs, including administrative costs.144 As
such, it appears the current FCRA method of calculating subsidies is

137

138
139
140
141

142
143

144

CBO SUBSIDY ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at 10; Federal Student Loan
Estimates, supra note 121; Bickley, supra note 123, at 13.
See, e.g., Bickley, supra note 123, at 15.
Id.
Federal Student Loan Estimates, supra note 121.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING FOR FEDERAL CREDIT
PROGRAMS 10–11 (2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attach
ments/03-05-FairValue_Brief.pdf [hereinafter FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING].
Id.
The Path to Prosperity: A Responsible Balanced Budget, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS.
51
(Mar.
2013),
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy14budget.pdf
(discussing the use of fair-value scoring to properly evaluate taxpayer risk from
government backed housing loans).
Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127 Stat.
506, § 4.

34

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 6

beginning to be confronted by Congress and will require re-estimates
of costs and subsidies or eventual unbudgeted write-downs.
2. Underestimated Costs of Programs and Increased Treasury
Rates
There are two looming issues that could seriously impact the
federal student loan cost structure which have not properly been taken
into account through the FCRA. First, new federal programs such as
IBR,145 PAYE,146 and PSLF147 modify the repayment estimates
negatively, and these changes have not been fully factored into FCRA
subsidy estimates.
Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 661a(9), agencies are required to recalculate
cash flows when a modification occurs.148 This includes budgetary
impacts “resulting from new legislation, or from the exercise of
administrative discretion under existing law, that directly or indirectly
alters the estimated cost of outstanding direct loans (or direct loan
obligations) or loan guarantees (or loan guarantee commitments) such
as a change in collection procedures.”149
The IBR, PAYE, and PSLF programs modified the FCRA
calculations, but the Department has not fully incorporated these
changes into its long-term cost estimates. For example, a number of
policy experts have noted that the IBR program allows many students
to take on large amounts of graduate school debt with reduced risk of
repayment.150 One Barclays study estimated the cost of the programs
145
146

147
148
149
150

20 U.S.C. § 1098e; 34 C.F.R. § 685.221 (2013).
See, e.g., SAFRA Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2213, 124 Stat. 1071, 1081
(2010) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2008)) (changes effective July 1, 2014);
34 C.F.R. § 685.209; Help Americans Manage Student Loan Debt, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011
/10/25/fact-sheet-help-americans-manage-student-loan-debt (President Obama
used his executive authority to move up the implementation of Pay-As-YouEarn to starting in 2012 with any loans disbursed after October 1, 2007).
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219.
2 U.S.C. § 661a(9) (2012).
Id.
See, e.g., Kelly Edmiston, et al, Student Loans: Overview and Issues (Update),
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 14 (Apr. 2013), http://www
.kansascityfed.org/publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwp%2012-05.pdf; Jason Delisle &
Alex Holt, Safety Net or Windfall? Examining Changes to Income-Based
Repayment for Federal Student Loans, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION 11, 13 (Oct.
2012),
http://edmoney.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs
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to be around $300 billion over the next ten years.151 The report
estimated, based on research from a study by the Kansas City Federal
Reserve, that roughly half of students would utilize the IBR programs,
whereas the Department currently estimates that only 6% of students
will do so.152
The Department has underestimated the size of the IBR program
participation and has not fully recognized the cost because of overlyoptimistic estimates. In 2007, when the IBR Program was introduced,
the CBO estimated its cost at $1.9 billion through 2017.153 The CBO
also estimated that this cost would be offset by students utilizing direct
loans, which have more favorable budgetary treatment than FFEL
loans.154 For the new PLSF program, the Department estimated the
cost to be $2.1 billion from 2012 to 2021, or roughly $233 million per
year.155
When the annual cost estimates of the IBR and PLSF programs are
combined, the cost to the U.S. taxpayers is less than $1 billion per year
and less than 1% of the estimated $100 billion in annually disbursed
loans. This cost estimate must be recalculated as it becomes clear that
more students will pursue these options. Additionally, a student using
the IBR hides default risk by extending the recognition event until the
loan is officially cancelled after twenty to twenty-five years.156

151

152
153
154
155

156

/NAF_Income_Based_Repayment.pdf (noting that many graduates that are not
“struggling” are taking advantage of current IBR rates); Matt Leichter, IncomeBased Repayment: Lifeline for Law Graduates, Certain Loser for Government,
THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com
/PubArticleALD.jsp?id=1202574613758&IncomeBased_Repayment_Lifeline_f
or_Law_Graduates_Certain_Loser_for_Government.
Jason Delisle, Barclays Student Loan Report: New Income Based Repayment
Enrollment to Balloon, $235 Billion Hidden Cost, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
(Dec. 13, 2012), http://edmoney.newamerica.net/blogposts/2012/barclays
_student_loan_report_new_income_based_repayment_enrollment_to_balloon_
cost_75.
Id.
Delisle & Holt, supra note 150, at 38 n.13.
Id.
Proposed Rulemaking for Student Loan Programs, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,086, 42,087,
42,122 (July 17, 2012).
For example, if an individual earns $10,000 per year then he or she has no
obligation to make payments on his or her student loans and his or her loan
balance would be cancelled after twenty years. That individual will never be
delinquent or in default of his or her student loans despite never making a

36

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 6

The second looming budgetary risk is that the current discount rate
does not reflect the riskiness of the student loans. As stated above, the
primary reason for the negative subsidy for the past couple of years is
that interest rates for treasury notes have been at historic lows.157 The
discount rate is tied to the federal treasury rates, so any increase in
federal rates will correspondingly reduce the negative subsidy for
direct loan programs.158 Eventually, federal interest rate increases will
trigger additional subsidy costs, and the government will need to
allocate funding to cover such costs. If the FCRA discount rate is
redefined to include the fair value of the riskiness of student loans, this
also will lead to additional subsidy costs in the federal budget. Because
these are unsecured loans, this change in the discount rate probably
will be significant but also necessary to properly estimate the cost of
the student loan programs.
The SLCA has helped reduce the budget risk of increasing federal
treasury rates by tying new loan origination interest rates to increases
in the 10-Year Treasury Note rates.159 This legislation is a great
example of an effort to use short-term federal costs to achieve longterm budget stability, and it also demonstrates the viability of student
loan reform so long as it favorably impacts the budget and balance
sheet. The legislation also shows the willingness of Congress to
introduce a market-based pricing mechanism into the student loan
market to mitigate federal risks.
The CBO estimates that the SLCA will have a short-term
budgetary cost of $8 billion and $12 billion in 2013 and 2014,
respectively.160 By 2023, the SLCA is projected to save the federal
government an overall $715 million from increased student loan rates
because of projected increases in 10-Year Treasury Note rates.161 The
real savings here is not the $715 million projected over eleven years
but rather the elimination of the budgetary uncertainty caused by

157
158
159
160

161

payment, so long as that individual submits the requisite filings under the
Income-Based Repayment plan.
Bickley, supra note 123, at 11.
See id.
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b) (2012).
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO ESTIMATE OF THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THE
BIPARTISAN STUDENT LOAN CERTAINTY ACT OF 2013 (July 22, 2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/Bipartisan%20Stu
dent%20Loan%20Certainty%20Act%20of%202013.pdf.
Id.
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increases of federal interest rates for the FCRA subsidy estimate
calculations.162 Although this mitigates some budget risk from
increased federal interest rates, the SLCA fails to tie the student loan
rates to the actual riskiness of the student loans. It also does not
address the inaccurate FCRA estimates for roughly $1 trillion of
student loans already in existence.
Most experts, including the CBO, agree that the government
should use a fair-value approach for the accounting treatment of
student loans.163 Risks ranging from imprecise accounting treatments
to unrecognized costs will cause significant changes in the federal
balance sheet and budget. The question then becomes: who should
bear this greater risk and potential cost? Additionally, are there ways
to limit the cost to the government while also creating better incentives
in the student loan market? The federal government should be
evaluating different methods: (1) to reduce its risk exposure to almost
$1 trillion in student loans; (2) to accurately prepare budgets for future
student loan costs; and (3) to use policy tools to incentivize positive
educational outcomes.
B. Risks Stemming From a Lack of Quality Education
Control
The second policy issue confronting current student loan programs
is the federal government’s inability to connect the educational
outcome feedback loop by tying together the interest of the students,
the accreditors, the student loan originators—currently the federal
government—and the regulators. This section summarizes the federal
government’s failed attempts to regulate educational quality and
briefly analyzes alternative quality education indicator mechanisms
such as risk-based pricing, put-options, and cost sharing with States.
1. Failed Federal Regulation of Quality Education
From the inception of financial aid through the G.I. Bill and the
Higher Education Act, the federal government has delegated quality
control to states or accreditors.164 In its effort to protect taxpayer
162

163
164

See David P. Smole, An Examination of Student Loan Interest Rate Proposals in
the 113th Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 30 (Jul. 26, 2013), http://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43094.pdf (explaining how increased federal interest
rates impact subsidy cost estimates and market-based rates can limit that cost).
FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING, supra note 141, at 1.
See discussion, supra Part II.A.
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dollars and push education reform, the Department has occasionally
focused its regulation on quality education indicators in for-profit
postsecondary academic institutions. These policies have had mixed
results.
Starting in the 1990s, federal regulators attempted to rein in bad
acting institutions through minimal requirements to enroll students,
such as the Ability to Benefit test and Cohort Default Rate
regulations.165 The Department’s most recent foray into quality
education imposed more stringent and measurable restrictions on
proprietary, for-profit institutions through the 2010 Gainful
Employment Regulations (GER).166 The GER stated, inter alia, that
student loan repayment rates must be at least 35% and annual
repayment must be less than or equal to 30% of the borrower’s
discretionary income or less than or equal to 12% of annual
earnings.167 If the institution failed both measures for three out of four
years, then it would lose access to financial aid, including loan
programs.168
This attempt to regulate for-profit institutions based on learning
outcomes—repayment rates based on income—was circumvented
when the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the promulgated regulations in
July 2012.169 The Court ruled that the 35% repayment rate was not
based on the agency record and was therefore arbitrary and in violation
of the Administrative Procedures Act.170 Although the Court vacated
all of GER, the Department intends to promulgate the new rules in the
165

166

167

168
169

170

See 34 C.F.R. § 668.32(e) (2012) (listing requirements for student eligibility for
loan assistance, including the “ability to benefit” test); id. §§ 668.181–668.197,
668.200–668.217 (establishing regulations for cohort default rates).
See generally Gainful Employment Information, DEP’T OF EDUCATION,
http://ifap.ed.gov/GainfulEmploymentInfo/ (last visited May 15, 2013)
[hereinafter Gainful Employment Information] (comprehensive resource for
statutes, regulations, and agency commentary on Gainful Employment).
See 34 C.F.R. § 668.7(a) (invalidated by Ass’n of Private Colleges & Univs. v.
Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137 (D.D.C. 2012)) (vacating that portion of the
regulation that required student loan repayment rates to be over 35% on the
grounds that the rate was “arbitrary and capricious”).
Id. § 668.7(i).
Ass’n of Private Colleges & Univs. v. Duncan, 870 F. Supp. 2d 133, 137
(D.D.C. 2012).
Id. at 154 (“Because the Department has not provided a reasonable explanation
of that figure, the court must conclude that it was chosen arbitrarily.”).
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future.171 While GER was vacated, the separate disclosure provisions
were not.172 Federal officials have refocused the Department’s
oversight function to promoting transparency instead of substantive
quality standards.173
The recent push for greater direct regulation of education quality
has failed even though GER was a step in the right direction. Federal
regulators have had limited success at determining quality of
education, either because they cannot react fast enough—the
proverbial “whack-a-mole” problem174—or because they are restricted
by law against direct regulation.175 Also, these regulations have
focused only on for-profit institutions, which are required to show
their educations lead to “gainful employment.” This has left non-profit
and public institutions largely unregulated for student loan repayment
and stricter disclosure standards. The federal government, due to
administrative law and its own bureaucratic process, has not been able
to implement regulations to provide quality education indicators. Other
quality indicators, especially indicators set outside federal regulation,
could provide a much better quality of education indicator to students,
educators, and regulators.
2. Alternative Mechanisms for Educational Quality Control
There have been other proposals to insert indicators based on
student loan repayment rates to close the quality education feedback
loop. Aside from the failed GER mentioned above, academics have
proposed implementing risk-based pricing, put-options for earnings
outcomes, and risk sharing through the states. All of these proposals
171
172

173

174

175

See Gainful Employment Information, supra note 166.
See, e.g., 34 CFR § 668.6(a); Memorandum from Jeff Baker, Director, Policy
Liaison and Implementation, Federal Student Aid regarding Status of Gainful
Employment Regulations (Jul. 6, 2012), http://ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements
/070612GE39StatusofGainfulEmploymentRegs.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
See Memorandum from David Bergeron, Acting Assistant Sec’y for PostSecondary Educ., Gainful Employment Electronic Announcement #42 – 20112012 Disclosures for Gainful Employment Programs (Nov. 23, 2012),
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/112312GEAnnounce42Disclosureof
GEPrograms1112.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
See generally Fawn Johnson, ‘Whack-a-Mole’ Continues on For-Profit
Colleges, NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 2, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whack-a-mole-continues-on-for-profit-colleges-20110204.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (2012) (barring federal control of educational
institutions).
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help form the policy background to create a market-based indicator to
close the educational quality feedback loop.
a. Risk-Based Pricing
Professor Michael Simkovic has proposed introducing risk-based
pricing on student loans to reduce student loan debt and to provide
students with educational outcome indicators.176 Conceptually, riskbased pricing assigns different interest rates on student loans based on
a number of indicators used to predict the borrower’s credit risk.177
Risk-based interest rates could be based on a borrower’s choice of
major,178 class rank, test scores,179 or, to a lesser extent, on the specific
characteristics of the institution.180 For example, a student studying in
a STEM major—science, technology, engineering, or math—would
have a lower interest rate on his or her loans than a student studying
the humanities, journalism, or law.181 This differential in interest rates
would signal to students the riskiness of the debt and also the
likelihood of employment and earnings in the field.
The approach described in a 2012 Note published in Harvard Law
Review differs somewhat in its treatment of risk-based factors by
focusing solely on post-graduation employment prospects through two
factors: (1) quality of education; and (2) the area of study.182 The Note
proposed using an updated Cohort Default Rate defined by the federal
government to determine institutional quality.183 A Cohort Default rate
is defined by statute and regulation and determines the percentage of
individuals from the same institution that have defaulted on their
student loans.184 The Note also suggested using two factors to
determine the riskiness of a course of study: (1) average wages from a
certain major; and (2) debt-to-income ratios.185
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

185

Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530; see also Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 588–89.
Simkovic, supra note 1, at 596–97.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 630–31 & nn. 282–84.
Id. at 622–23.
Id. at 625.
Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 599.
Id. at 599–600.
20 U.S.C. § 1085(m) (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.181–668.197, 668.200–668.217
(2012).
Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 600.
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Risk-based pricing would indicate to student borrowers which
areas of study have more repayment risk than others.186 This approach
is laudable because it attempts to close the feedback loop between
students, educators, and government officials by guiding educational
preferences more efficiently. Also, it presumably will reduce
repayment risks to the federal government.
The problem with risk-based pricing is that it introduces risk to
signal quality education at precisely the wrong place—the student. It is
very unlikely that a prospective student will rationally weigh the
varying interest rates for programs to make an informed choice based
on a risk-reward analysis. While it is true that college shopping by
students and families take up a considerable amount of time already,
the addition of risk-based interest rates per program, per school, or
both would add another layer of complexity. Thus, different interest
rates may not necessarily get the desired result of students making
better decisions.187
Federally set risk-based pricing may also violate 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232a, which bars federal control over programs or curriculum,
because it would unduly influence an institution’s autonomy. Further,
if the rates are based on risk and are efficiently priced, then it is
unclear why federal funding is required instead of just private loans—
unless the risk-based pricing only slightly accounts for the loan risk
and there is still a government subsidy.
b. Institutional Put-Option – Risk-Sharing with Market
Based Pricing
A recent proposal to reform student loans by Michael C.
Macchiarola and Arun Abraham encompasses the best public policy
incentives while also providing a mechanism to provide educational
quality indicators to academic institutions.188 In their paper, which
focuses on law schools exclusively but easily could be expanded to all
higher education, they propose that institutions should give students a

186
187

188

See id. at 598.
See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 624 (noting that some relative levels of risk
associated with a given student may be based on factors that are beyond that
particular student’s control and outside the scope of his or her educational
decisions).
Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 119.

42

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 6

put-option to guarantee certain minimum earnings over a period of
time.189
A put-option is a contract between two parties that gives the
buyer—student—“the right, but not the obligation, to sell (to the put
seller) an underlying security or other item of value at an agreed-upon
price.”190 Macchiarola and Abraham logically matched expected
earnings with what a student would have to earn to repay the student
loans within a standard ten year payment schedule if the student paid
only fifteen percent of his or her disposable income.191 This
calculation mirrors the IBR payment plan.192 If the earnings are less
than the expected amount, then the student can exercise the put-option
to have the school pay the difference between the student’s expected
minimum earnings and lower actual earnings.193
A put-option bought by universities based on expected earnings of
students is both groundbreaking and logically sound.194 Who better to
bear a portion of the risk of a student loan than the institution that
provides the service? Because of the informational asymmetry,
institutions are better risk-bearers than individual students for adverse
outcomes tied to student loans.195 Also, the put-option is based on
individual outcomes, so the institution has a vested interest in
encouraging students with high debt levels to choose prudent majors
for better career options. The problems with the put-option are as
follows: (1) it is too complicated to implement on a student-perstudent basis; and (2) institutions, which would bear the cost, do not
have an incentive or requirement to implement the program.
c. Cost Sharing with States: A Roadmap from the 1990s
The concept of closing the educational feedback loop by
financially tying student loan repayment rates to state and institutional
performances has been tried before with bipartisan support. In 1991,
189
190
191
192

193
194
195

Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 119 (citation omitted).
Id. at 120.
See generally Repayment Plans, Financial Student Aid, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans, (last visited Apr. 3,
2013).
Macchiarola & Abraham, supra note 3, at 121–22.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 110–11.
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George H. W. Bush proposed in his budget a “risk sharing” plan,
where states would have to compensate the federal government for
poorly-performing student loans from institutions licensed within each
state.196 The proposal became law in 1993 when Congress amended
Section 428 of the Higher Education Act by adding subsection (n),
titled “Cost Sharing by States.”197 Somewhat bold at the time, the
amendment made states pay a portion of the losses from student loans
tied to institutions with a 20% or more cohort default rate.198 Starting
in 1995, the state would be forced to pay 12.5% of the student loan
losses from institutions that exceeded the 20% threshold default
rate.199 This rate would then increase to the state paying 50% of any
excess over the 20% threshold default rate.200 The amendment also
allowed states to charge fees, subject to the Department’s approval, to
institutions based on institutions’ cohort default rates and states’ risk
of having to pay the loan losses.201
This provided an indirect method of closing the educational
feedback loop for poorly-performing schools. If institutions
collectively had a default rate higher than 20%, then the state would
have been exposed to liability for some of the defaulted student loan
losses. States have the power to approve institutions operating in their
196

197

198

199

200
201

Mary Crystal Cage, Bush Proposes That States Share Risks of Student Loans,
THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 13, 1991), http://chronicle.com/article
/Bush-Proposes-That-States/89248/.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4201, 107
Stat. 312, 370–71 (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1078(n) (1994) (repealed 1998)).
See id.; see also State Share of Default Costs, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,038, 52,039–40
(Oct. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Cost Sharing Proposed Regs.] (explaining the
purpose of the statute and proposed rule in greater detail).
20 U.S.C. § 1078(n) (1994) (repealed 1998). The calculation finds the amount of
loans that exceeded the 20% cohort default rate for all institutions in the state
and then applies a fee to the new loan volume based on the amount over 20%
from the Cohort Default Rate. A summary of the Calculation: (New Loan
Volume For Current Year For All Institutions Within The State) x (Percentage
Cost-Share, Starting at 12.5% to 50%) x (Amount of Loans in Default over 20%
for Past Repayment Period / All loans From Institutions Within State For The
Same Repayment Period). For example, if collectively institutions within the
state had 21% of loans in default for the repayment period (21% - 20% is 1%
that exceeds the threshold), then the state would have been required to pay the
Department in 1995 a fee of 0.125% (1% x 12.5%) on all new loan volume for
institutions within that state.
Id.
Id.

44

UMass Law Review

v. 9 | 6

state,202 so the federal law assumed each state would be able to put
pressure on poorly performing institutions to improve. The
Department attempted to promulgate regulations to clarify the statute
but later withdrew the proposed regulations.203
This cost sharing scheme was repealed in 1998.204 It is unclear
whether this policy was ever fully implemented or if it had any
success.205 Part of the concern was that the federal government
imposed a fee on the states for defaulting loans even though states
have little direct authority, outside of institutional approval, to set
quality standards.206
IV. HISTORY OF STUDENT LOAN SECURITIZATION
Any successful student loan reform must provide a feedback
mechanism to encourage positive education outcomes while also
reducing government risk from student loans. Securitization
potentially can fulfill both of these requirements. As to the first
requirement, securitization will force third-party pricing of the student
loan assets based on expected repayment rates. This will create a
market-based price to gauge the quality of education for institutions or
programs.
Repayment rates of student loans, as used in the past with GER
and the alternative proposals, have not been implemented with the
proper incentive structures or feedback mechanisms. A third-party
202

203

204

205

206

See State Authorization of Postsecondary Education, SHEEO, http://www.sheeo
.org/projects/state-authorization-postsecondary-education (last visited Apr. 5,
2013).
Compare Cost Sharing Proposed Regs., supra note 198, at 52,039–40
(proposing to amend 34 C.F.R. § 682.418 to clarify 20 U.S.C. § 1078(n) (1994)
(repealed 1998)), with FFEL Final Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,424, 61,425
(Nov. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Final Cost Sharing Regs.] (“Based on the
comments received in response to the NPRM, the Secretary has determined that
more time is needed to review and address the concerns raised by the
commenters regarding implementation of section 428(n) of the HEA.”).
Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 417(j), 112
Stat. 1581, 1690.
Missouri, for example, enacted a law in 1994 to evaluate its financial risk from
the new cost sharing program established by the then-current, now repealed,
version of 20 U.S.C. § 1078(n). See MO. REV. STAT. § 173.055 (1994) (repealed
2012).
See Final Cost Sharing Regs., supra note 203, at 61,425; Cage, supra note 196.
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pricing mechanism, where institutions retain some of the risk of
student loans, provides incentives to institutions to change their
behavior to achieve better educational outcomes and repayment rates.
The government already has demonstrated a willingness to use thirdparty pricing mechanisms to set student loan interest rates.207 While
certainly imperfect, this type of quality education indicator provides
direct feedback to students, regulators, and officials and bypasses
concerns about the federal government directly regulating the quality
of education.
As to the second requirement, the federal government, through
securitization, could reduce its exposure to risk by selling all or a
portion of its $1 trillion direct loan portfolio to private investors. From
a budgetary standpoint, there are two reasons for selling student loans
to third parties. First, by selling the loans, the risk exposure to the
federal government is reduced proportionally. As demonstrated in the
discussion of FCRA estimates, the federal government has struggled to
accurately monitor or price loan risks. Selling some of these assets
would reduce the impact of this risk. Second, by selling the loans, the
federal government is capitalizing assets that can be used either to
make more loans, fund other federal programs, or to pay off debt.
Here, the benefits become even more apparent: if the Department
sells $500 billion in student loans, it could reduce the federal debt—
issued to pay out the loans in the first place—and increase its available
revenue. This one-time benefit could be used strategically at a time of
fiscal crisis to raise money, much like a corporation sells assets to
recapitalize its balance sheet.208 Currently, there is a robust market for
third-party investment in student loans and the federal government
could capitalize on this demand while reducing risk.209 The following
207

208

209

Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127 Stat.
506, §2(a); 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b) (2012).
Of course, there have to be buyers and a fire-sale of the assets is even less
beneficial. One could easily imagine a situation where the federal government is
attempting to sell off assets during a crisis (e.g., during the sub-prime crisis of
2008) to raise funds and the market is incapable of purchasing the assets at a
market rate. Alternatively, the federal government has had modestly positive
results selling the assets in the TARP program. See Report of the Troubled Asset
Relief Program, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/TARP10-2012_0.pdf.
See SOCIAL FINANCE, infra note 249; COMMONBOND, infra note 252 (numerous
for-profit and non-profit companies have recently sprung up to refinance federal
student loans).
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sections analyze whether securitization of federal direct loans has been
attempted in the past and whether such an approach would be feasible
in terms of public policy and the federal budget.
A. Securitization Principles
Securitization is a vague term that courts, federal officials, and
scholars have struggled to define. This lack of definition makes it hard
for parties to understand their contractual obligations, rights, and risks.
Notably, the term “securitization” has not even been defined by the
most recent reform to financial regulations, Dodd-Frank.210 In broad
terms, securitization is the pooling of payable accounts—accounts
receivable, mortgages, credit card receivables, student loans—into one
legal entity to hold the assets, which are collectively sold to third
parties as one diversified investment. Simplified, the structure of
securitization looks like this:
Inputs  Structure  Outputs
Jonathon Lipson recently defined securitization more narrowly by
distinguishing true securitization in a legal sense from other similar
capital structures. In his article, RE: Defining Securitization, he
provides this overarching definition:
[T]rue securitization is defined as a purchase of primary payment
rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such
payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of
the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance
of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so
211
purchased.

This definition focuses on isolation at bankruptcy through a “true sale”
because there is a legal transaction that clearly defines ownership,
rights, and obligations.212
In
summary,
Lipson’s
definition
requires
inputs
(loans/receivables), a structure (Special Purpose Entity (SPE) that is
legally separated from the parent corporation), and outputs (selling of
210

211
212

Lipson, supra note 6, at 1258 (“Dodd-Frank—the most ambitious attempt to
regulate capital markets since the Depression . . . does not even attempt to define
securitization.”); see also Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protections Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
Id. at 1233.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
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securities backed by inputs).213 For example, if a bank sells a mortgage
to a SPE, the sale must be a true sale in the eyes of the bankruptcy
court so that if the SPE becomes bankrupt, there are no residual rights
against the bank.214 A SPE, usually separately incorporated to
segregate liability and obligations from the owner of loans, raises
money by selling ownership of itself to pay the originator of the loans.
A prominent legal scholar, Steven Schwarcz, rejected this
formalistic framework in favor of a more flexible definition.215
Schwarcz argues that securitization should: (1) be pragmatic; (2)
mirror market perception of the term; and (3) be flexible enough to
evolve with financial evolution.216 According to Schwarcz, the Lipson
definition restricts certain structured finance models that traditionally
have been labeled as securitization.217 Under the Lipson definition, a
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) would not be an example of
securitization because such an obligation does not result in a true
sale.218 CDOs are securities sold in the market like bonds; a CDO’s
interest payments are derived from rights to pools of receivables, such
as mortgages or student loans, but there is no direct ownership.219
While the Lipson definition is more precise, the Schwarcz concept
arguably is the more generally accepted definition of securitization.
B. Government Sponsored Enterprises & Securitization
The federal government is no stranger to securitizing its loans
programs. From a formalistic perspective, a GSE represents one of the
first and largest incarnations of SPEs used in securitization. While
many claim that Lewis S. Ranieri and other bond traders at Solomon
Brothers were the “Fathers of Securitization,”220 the concept was
pioneered in the 1930s during the Great Depression through the
creation of GSEs to help fund residential mortgages and increase
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

Lipson, supra note 6, at 1233.
See id. at 1233–34.
Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1284.
Id. at 1288–95.
Id. at 1284.
See id. at 1293.
Id. at 1292–93.
Lewis S. Ranieri: Your Mortgage Was His Bond, BUSINESS WEEK (Nov. 28,
2004),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2004-11-28/lewis-s-dot-ranieriyour-mortgage-was-his-bond.
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access to homeownership.221 Ginnie Mae further developed the
Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) market in 1970.222 A GSE is
defined loosely but has the following general characteristics: “(1)
private sector ownership, (2) limited competition, (3) activities limited
by congressional charter, and (4) chartered privileges that create an
inferred federal guarantee of obligations.”223 GSEs traditionally were
created to provide liquidity in loan markets, which theoretically
increases the money available to lend to individuals—be they students,
potential home owners, or farmers.224
By creating a “market” for these loans, lenders are able to sell
them to investors—thus capitalizing the assets—and then relend the
money to new lenders. In macro-economics, this process commonly is
referred to as the money multiplier theory and is used to explain how
the government can increase or decrease money supply.225 Where
GSEs were instituted to provide liquidity, theoretically there should be
an increase in lending and money supply in a particular lending
market.
Using the logic of liquidity and improved access to money,
Congress formed the GSE Sallie Mae in 1972 to buy guaranteed
student loans from lenders to recapitalize private lenders.226
221

222

223

224
225

226

See, e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences:
The Role and Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489,
1495 (2011).
Alan Feuer, Poof! How Home Loans Transform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/nyregion/20mortgage.html.
Kevin R. Kosar, Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): An Institutional
Review, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE CSR-2 (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/RS21663.pdf.
Id. at CSR-3.
See, e.g., Seth B. Carpenter & Selva Demiralp, Money, Reserves, and the
Transmission of Monetary Policy: Does the Money Multiplier Exist?, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY 3 (May 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds
/2010/201041/201041pap.pdf; Bill Mitchell, Money Multiplier and Other Myths,
BILL MITCHELL BILLY BLOG (Apr. 21, 2009), http://bilbo.economicoutlook
.net/blog/?p=1623. Other scholars have disagreed with the macro-economic
impact of this policy. See, e.g., Carpenter & Demiralp, supra, at 2.
Education Amendments of 1972 § 439(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 265
(1972).
The Congress hereby declares that it is the purpose of this section
to establish a Government-sponsored enterprise which will be
financed by private capital and which will serve as a secondary
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Eventually, Sallie Mae would buy the loans, package them together,
and sell securities based on these assets—commonly referred to as
Student Loan Asset-Backed Securities (SLABS), which are
structurally similar to MBS. GSEs also have favorable accounting
treatment for the federal budget because the balance sheets of GSEs,
such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Sallie Mae—now completely
privatized—are not included in the federal balance sheet. 227
During the 2008 economic crisis, however, the government was
forced to purchase loan assets from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
report these credit risks as a liability on the balance sheet.228 This is an
example of how GSE risk, while off the balance sheet, can still impact
the federal government. Ginnie Mae, which is backed fully by the
federal government, is also considered a GSE in order for the federal
government to remove the loans and guarantees from the federal
balance sheet.229 The impact of this accounting treatment for GSEs is
that the government provides only a guarantee on the loans, or some
portion thereof, similar to the FFEL program, and most of the costs
and loan assets are not shown on the federal balance sheet.
C. Dodd-Frank “Skin in the Game” Risk Retention Provisions
Securitizing companies such as GSEs and banks created a negative
feedback loop where originators did not have an incentive to ensure
quality lending requirements.230 This is conceptually similar to the lack
of institutional incentives to improve repayment rates of student loans.
In the housing market, banks or lenders would originate loans and then
sell the loan immediately to a third party through securitization.
Because originators had a financial incentive to close the loan and to
sell it at par value, underwriting standards became lax.231 Regulators
market and warehousing facility for insured student loans, insured
by the Commissioner under this part or by a State or nonprofit
private institution or organization with which the Commissioner
has an agreement under section 428(b), and which will provide
liquidity for student loan investments.
Id.; see Wolfe, supra note 47.
227
228
229

230
231

2012 U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 85.
Id. at 11.
Ginnie Mae & the GSEs, GINNIE MAE, http://www.ginniemae.gov/consumer
_education/Pages/ginnie_mae_and_the_gses.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
Id.
Id.
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have explained this concept by stating that originators did not have any
proverbial “skin in the game.”232 This negative feedback loop and
other issues in the lending industry forced Congress to pass a risk
retention provision in the Dodd-Frank Act.233
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that any securitizer of an assetbacked security retain not less than five percent ownership of any
security it issues.234 A securitizer is an entity that issues asset-backed
securities or organizes and initiates such sales.235 An asset-backed
security is a fixed income asset, or collateralized financial asset, that
pays the holder primarily through payments from the loans it owns.236
This risk retention requirement includes SLABS of private student
loans and also may include SLABS of FFEL loans.237 This
requirement has been contentious, with many scholars arguing that it
limits the marketplace, impedes the purpose of securitization—selling
assets, reducing risk, liquidity—and is ineffective at achieving its goal
of aligning incentives between originators, securitizers, and
investors.238
Currently, academic institutions are not originators under DoddFrank because they do not issue student loans or securities based on
student loans. However, it would not be too great a conceptual leap to
redefine academic institutions as originators under Dodd-Frank and
subject them to the risk retention provisions.
The retention requirement also pulls the definition of securitization
into the forefront to determine whether student loans could be sold to
private investors. The retention requirement creates a residual
obligation or ownership, which could be interpreted to block the “true
sale” requirement imposed by Lipson’s definition.239 This definition, if
applied to student loan securitization, would make it difficult to retain
232

233
234
235
236
237
238

239

David Line Batty, Dodd-Frank’s Requirement of “Skin in the Game” for AssetBacked Securities May Scalp Corporate Loan Liquidity, 15 N.C. BANKING INST.
13, 44 (2011); Toben & Osolinik, supra note 46, at 196.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2012).
Id. at § 78o-11(c)(1)(B).
Id. at § 78o-11(a)(3).
Id. at § 78c(79)(A).
Toben & Osolinik, supra note 46, at 196.
Id.; Batty, supra note 232, at 38 (arguing that it is unlikely that the risk retention
requirements would have reduced the risk associated with the subprime
mortgage crisis).
See Lipson, supra note 6, at 1233.
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the Income-Base Repayment and Public Service Loan Forgiveness
programs without the government having a residual obligation to the
investor to cover the cost of the programs.
D. Securitization of Student Loans
A comparison of the markets for student loans and mortgages leads
to an interesting policy analysis because the government has adopted
markedly different approaches for solving problems related to
liquidity, risk reduction, and credit enhancements. Other scholars also
have drawn close similarities to the sub-prime mortgage market and
the current student loan market.240 Prior to 2010, the government used
Sallie Mae and other entities to securitize the FFEL guaranteed loans.
Since then, however, the government has opted to lend directly to
students and place the loans on its balance sheet using FCRA to
estimate its value. By comparison, the government relies almost
exclusively on GSEs and private banks to provide liquidity in the
residential mortgage market. 241
So, why would the government securitize the assets of mortgages
but not student loans? Generally, there are two issues. First, a
mortgage is backed by a secured interest in real property, while a
student loan has no secured interest. Second, a robust private mortgage
market exists with minimal direct government involvement, whereas
most student loans are funded directly through the government; thus,
there is less need to securitize student loans.242 Despite these
limitations, the framework for securitizing student loans is already in
place from previous FFEL programs, and it would not be difficult to
implement. The Department has statutory authority to sell loans to
third parties so long as it is “in the best interest of the United
States.”243 It also has methods for measuring actual and estimated cash
flows based on loan cohorts’ classes, schools, or programs.244

240
241
242

243
244

See Wimberg, supra note 5, at 190–91.
2012 U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 68.
There is, however, a rebuttal that the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac are clear examples of direct involvement and support from the government
to aid the securitization of mortgages.
20 U.S.C. § 1087i (2012).
See FSA 2012 BUDGET, supra note 41, at 103–07 (auditor’s discussion of the
Department’s methods for calculating estimated cash flows based on current
historical results).
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E. Current Market for Securitized Student Loans
If securitization is to be used as a public policy tool to reform the
student loan market, there must first be some proof that an established
market exists for such investments. Private student loans, which are
arguably more risky than federal loans, have been securitized into
SLABS, and there has been an active market for these securities for
years.245 The FFEL loans also were securitized through lenders such as
Sallie Mae, and some of these loans still exist on government’s
balance sheet even though the program was defunded in 2010. Directly
owned federal loans also have been the target of investors who are
eager to capitalize on the relatively high interest rates.246
Some companies have recently sprung up to refinance federal
student loans by seeking investors from social and economic
standpoints. Social Finance (SoFi), for example, raises money from
alumni to either refinance student loans from federal loans or directly
originate new loans.247 The alumni are able to invest in students from
their alma mater while also receiving a small return on investment.248
The company focuses on refinancing or loaning to students that have
higher interest federal loans—6.8% to 7.9%—by offering loans at
5.99%, with lower fees, and matching the repayment terms of the
Direct Loan Program.249 By November 2012, the company originated
over $90 million in loans and had to pause its lending because demand
exceeded funding from alumni investors.250 It even obtained $60
million of funding from Morgan Stanley to originate more loans.251
245

246

247

248
249

250

251

Private Student Loans, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Aug.
2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student
-Loans.pdf.
Jason Delisle, Wall Street’s Pitch to Profit on Federal Student Loans, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct. 12, 2011), http://higheredwatch.newamerica.net
/node/58962.
Christina Farr, SoFi’s CEO: ‘The Student Loan Market is Broken. Let’s fix it’,
VENTURE BEAT (Sept. 18, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/09/18/sofistudent-loan/.
Id.
See Frequently Asked Questions, SOCIAL FINANCE, https://www.sofi.com/faq.
php (last visited May 15, 2013).
SoFi Begins Lending Again to Students and Graduates of 78 Schools, SOCIAL
FINANCE (Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.sofi.com/press/sofi-begins-lending-againto-students-and-graduates-of-78-schools/.
Id.
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Companies like SoFi and the existing SLABS market represent a
proof-of-concept for whether there is a market for securitizing federal
student loans.252
Securitization also would reduce the Department’s administrative
burden of directly managing its $1 trillion loan portfolio, which it has
struggled to manage appropriately in the past. Just recently, the
Department could not identify and assume control of over $1.1 billion
of delinquent loans managed by loan servicers.253 This delayed debt
collection activities on the defaulted loans and also prevented
individuals from rehabilitating the delinquent debt to regular status.254
Securitization is only feasible if the FCRA is reformed to
encompass fair-value accounting concepts. Otherwise, securitizing
student loans would result in large losses from selling the loans at
market rates—as opposed to the inflated FCRA estimates currently on
the federal balance sheet.255 By itself, the combined benefit of
reducing risk exposure and capitalizing assets is not likely to be
persuasive enough to change federal student loan policy. It does,
however, provide a structural mechanism to introduce market-based
risk pricing into postsecondary education. This feedback from neutral,
third-party investors can provide another quality education indicator to
participants.
V. PROPOSALS TO REDUCE GOVERNMENT RISK
Proposals for reducing government risks can be divided into two
categories. The first category includes proposals that can be
implemented immediately: (1) reforming the FCRA to more accurately
show the riskiness of student loan debt; (2) securitizing federal student
loan assets to reduce government risk; and (3) creating a market-based
risk sharing mechanism to offset some or all losses from securitization
252

253

254
255

See Info Center, COMMONBOND, http://commonbond.co/student-borrowers (last
visited May 15, 2013).
Debt Management Collection System, DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL 2 (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/audit
reports/fy2013/l02m0008.pdf.
Id.
Jason Delisle, Fair-Value Accounting Shows Switch to Guaranteed Student
Loans Costs $102 Billion, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Mar. 23, 2013),
http://edmoney.newamerica.net/blogposts/2012/fair_value_accounting_says
_switch_back_to_guaranteed_student_loans_costs_102_billion-.
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and provide a quality education indicator. The second category
includes proposals that will require further study: (1) devising
programs for risk-sharing mechanisms for loan assets; (2) devising
securitization structures by institutional origination through Perkins
Loans and pooling of federal assets with cost sharing provisions; and
(3) devising pooling options for securitization.
A. Proposals that Can Be Implemented Immediately
1. Fair-Value Accounting & FCRA Reform
The federal government’s accounting of student loans is flawed
and should be changed to reflect fair-value accounting principles,
which would take into account contingent losses that are known and
reasonably estimated and the gains or losses caused solely by
adjustment of federal interest rates.256 The recent change tying new
loans to 10-Year Treasury Notes does not fully mitigate FCRA cost
estimate losses because of caps on the rates,257 and it does not address
the inaccurate estimates of existing loans. A change to fair-value
accounting will cost the government by limiting the existing ‘negative
subsidy’ of federal loans and by more accurately writing down losses
based on the income-based repayment and public service loan
forgiveness programs;258 however, this accounting reform likely will
be required regardless of whether federal officials attempt additional
student loan reforms. Currently, the government receives roughly $35
billion in negative subsidies annually,259 and this undoubtedly will be
reduced when the government begins to estimate the value of the loans
more accurately.
If the Department is forced to account more accurately for its
student loan assets, losses from securitization will be reduced. In its
current form, any securitization will result in automatic losses to the
federal government because the loan assets are inflated artificially
through FCRA accounting. Without full guarantees of principal and
interest payments similar to the FFEL program, private investors will
demand lower prices for the assets than the valuation carried on the
Department’s balance sheet because of known risk exposure
256
257

258
259

See id.; FAIR-VALUE ACCOUNTING, supra note 141, at 1.
See Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-28, 127
Stat. 506, § 2; 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b) (2012).
See Delisle, supra note 255.
See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text.
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unrecognized through the current FCRA calculation. Thus, before any
sort of substantial student loan reform can occur, such as securitization
or risk sharing, a change to fair-value accounting is needed.
2. Securitization of Loans to Reduce Risk
Assuming accounting reform is successful, the federal government
should securitize some of its student loan assets by selling them to
third-party investors in order to reduce its future risk exposure—even
if it is fairly valued at the time of sale. There are a number of methods
the Department or the Treasury could take to monetize these assets.
These structures depend on the different definitions of securitization,
as discussed in Part IV. Generally, the federal government could
securitize its student loan assets in the following ways: (1) transfer
assets to a GSE similar to Ginnie Mae and issue SLABS with some
form of federal guarantees for principal and interest; (2) directly issue
SLABS just like Sallie Mae does for private loans; or (3) sell a
collateralized debt obligation with risk exposure to the student loan
assets but with no direct ownership.
The creation of a special purpose entity in the form of a GSE is a
proven approach to minimizing federal risk exposure to loan assets but
would not provide any reform in higher education. Because the federal
government fully owns all direct loans, it has the power to sell them to
a GSE.260 Sallie Mae did this until it became privatized in the late
1990s.261 Structurally, this would be similar to Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, whereby the GSE provides guarantees for some principal and
interest. It would not have the explicit backing of the federal
government unless it was structured similar to Ginnie Mae, which has
explicit government guarantees.262 The funding mechanism effectively
would deleverage the federal government, but it would not introduce
risk-pricing into the higher education market.263
260
261

262

263

20 U.S.C. § 1087i.
See Student Loan Marketing Association Reorganization Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, tit. VI, 110 Stat. 3009-275.
See Kathleen Pender, How Ginnie Mae differs from Fannie, Freddie, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article
/How-Ginnie-Mae-differs-from-Fannie-Freddie-3201149.php.
A GSE structure, with subsidies for principal and interest similar to Ginnie Mae,
does not introduce risk-pricing because there is no differentiation of risk
between loans; they are all equally supported or guaranteed by the government.
Such a structure reduces risk by selling assets but it does not adequately signal
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A similar proposal was made by investment bankers in 2011,
although it did not use a GSE structure.264 Under this proposal, the
government would have issued $555 billion in federal debt that would
have been bought by private investors to refinance federal direct loan
assets. The student loans would have been removed from the balance
sheet and reclassified as some other form of debt.265 As a result, the
newly issued debt would have been 100% guaranteed by the federal
government.266 While this would not reduce the government’s risk
exposure, it would allow investment bankers to generate large fees for
underwriting the new securities.267
From a public policy perspective, it is imperative that the federal
government retain some level of control over repayment programs. In
the case of a true sale of the loan assets, the government would have
to: (1) issue some sort of guarantee to cover the risk of public loan
forgiveness, and (2) subsidize loans that have income-based repayment
plans. These repayment programs reflect Congress’ recognition that
providing a better safety net and payment flexibility is sound social
policy.268 However, under a securitization scheme, these programs
increase the complexity of the structured finance products, which
already are complicated by repayment risk and other factors.269
Some form of a CDO likely provides the most flexible method of
securitizing student loans assets. Structurally, the Department would
issue SLABS bonds that would be tied to student loan revenue
streams. The holders of these bonds would not directly own the loan
assets; instead the bondholders would own the rights to all or some of
the revenue streams as payments are made by students. Thus, by
retaining ownership of the loans, the Department would be able to
continue its assistance programs to students while at the same time
reducing risk exposure from the asset sales. If a person qualifies for

264
265
266
267
268
269

which loans are riskier than others. Additionally, the federal government would
still bear the majority of the risk for the loans through the guarantees.
Delisle, supra note 246.
2012 U.S. FINANCIAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Glater, supra note 104, 58–59.
Costs and Policy Options for Federal Student Loan Programs, CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE 21 (Mar. 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs
/110xx/doc11043/03-25-studentloans.pdf.
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debt forgiveness or cancellation, this would operate similar to an early
repayment event, which would be funded by the Department from that
year’s budget.270 Additionally, using this CDO approach, the
government could either sell the assets as one risk profile—every
investor receives the same risk and portion of payment—or through
tranches—investors choose their priority to receive payments in return
for higher or lower yields on the amount invested.271 The debt
obligation could be managed by the Department, the Federal Treasury,
or a Special Purpose Vehicle within the government.272 Through the
FFEL program and the emergency ECASLA program, the Department
has an expertise in handling similarly complex loan transactions.273
Additionally, the Department supervises loan servicers for all direct
loans.274 The federal government has the expertise to securitize these
assets, especially if incentives are given to investment bankers to assist
the process through underwriting fees.275
Securitization, as a way to reduce risk to the government, arguably
does not form a strong enough reason for restructuring federal student
loan programs. Due to market risks, like those that lead to the 2008
crisis, securitization may not actually reduce risk exposure. Also, in
order to entice private investors, the government must sell the assets at
or below market value.276 Without FCRA reform, this undoubtedly
will be lower than the current value on the Department’s balance
sheet.277 What securitization does accomplish, however, is to open
student loan assets to financial evaluation by third parties. If there is
270
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market exposure to the loan assets, and not just 100% guarantees on
the securitized debt, then investors will assign market-based prices
based on the repayment risk. This risk pricing mechanism creates a
great opportunity to form another quality education indicator for
higher education institutions.
3. Market-Based Risk Sharing Mechanisms as Quality
Education Indicators
If the first two proposals are feasible, there is an opportunity to
combine the concept of Cost Sharing with States from the 1990s with
the general premise of the Put-Option proposal to create a marketbased quality education indicator.278 Instead of the states bearing the
burden for defaulting loans, this proposal would force academic
institutions to retain at least some of the credit risk of their students’
loans through risk retention. Once the loans are securitized, the
institutions would bear some portion of the risk. This would force
schools to incorporate such risks into their cost-benefit analyses. If a
school cannot bear the cost or risk, then the school will reduce risky
programs or shutdown.
Successful institutions will either internalize the additional costs, if
any, or pass the increased cost onto students with higher tuition. This,
much like the Risk-Based Pricing proposal by Simkovic,279 would
provide a quality education indicator to students for certain programs
or institutions without directly regulating loan interest rates.
Institutions would have the flexibility to determine whether to pass the
cost onto students. For example, a for-profit institution may choose to
bear the cost of government securitization to keep tuition low for
better long-term repayment rates. A large public university may
choose just to pass the cost onto the students.
This incentive structure could provide quality education indicators
to help institutions close the feedback loop on whether an education
program provides sufficient outcomes. Institutions could make
programs with risky learning outcomes—architecture, arts, English,
law—more selective to allow only the best students to enroll. This
would limit an institution’s exposure to defaulting student loans and
would presumably create better student outcomes. Additionally,
278

279

See 20 U.S.C. § 1078(n) (1994) (repealed 1998); Macchiarola & Abraham,
supra note 3, at 119–125.
See Simkovic, supra note 1, at 530.

2014

Securitization of Student Loans

59

institutions would be forced to make explicit cost-benefit analyses as
to whether a program provides sufficient employment outcomes to
justify the risk exposure of the student debt. It is possible that the
increased cost from risk sharing could be folded into future tuition
increases.280 Thus, future students would pay a higher cost of
education because of bad outcomes of past students. This increased
tuition cost could dissuade prospective students from attending the
institution in favor of cheaper options where the risk sharing costs of
loan repayments are decreased.
Implementation of this proposal would also force institutions to
take a more proactive role in providing academic advising and career
counseling. By giving accurate and realistic advice on choosing a
major and a career, a school would be able to reduce its risk by
promoting career paths that tend to be successful. Some institutions
have started to apply this concept. The approach, however, has been
piecemeal, and the incentive structure is lacking.281 The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau already has a program called “Know
Before You Owe,” but it is not integrated with financial aid or
academic advising at institutions.282
Most importantly, through implementation of this proposal,
accrediting agencies will receive direct feedback from the market as to
whether institutions provide educations of sufficient quality. For
example, if one offering of securitized student loans imposes a larger
cost than that of similar offerings, the accreditors will receive a clear
indication that there is something potentially wrong with the quality of
education at the institution offering the loans. The high cost of such an
offering also would indicate to the federal government that there is a
280
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need to encourage accrediting agencies to review the policies of the
aforementioned institutions; this market-based indicator would
compensate for the statutory prohibition against the government itself
making judgments about the quality of education.283 Conceptually, this
is similar to bond and credit ratings for universities that are monitored
by accreditors.284
Additionally, institutions must prove their administrative capacity
and financial responsibility, of which credit ratings and audits are a
component, to be eligible to receive Title IV funds.285 Instead of
placing the risk on the student by using risk-based pricing as proposed
by Simkovic,286 this proposal does not penalize young students that
have asymmetrical information in the postsecondary education market.
B. Proposals that Require Further Study
This section will outline the different policy options for risk
retention, securitization structures, and pooling methods.
Combinations of these structures will require further study by
economists, politicians, and regulators to determine which would be
the easiest to implement. While any of these methods are feasible, it
would be premature to eliminate one method over the other without
additional research. Because they only outline the process for
securitization, these securitization mechanics do not detrimentally
impact the underlying policy goals of reducing government risk and
providing a quality educational feedback indicator to institutions.
1. Risk-Sharing Losses & Risk Retention of Loan Assets
There are two potential methods to create a risk retention
mechanism with securitized student loans. First, the federal
government could utilize a risk-sharing device similar to previously
proposed and repealed cost sharing structures for defaulting loans
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enacted in the 1990s.287 When the securities are sold on the open
market, institutions would be fully or partially responsible for covering
any losses to the federal government. For instance, if the security was
at a $1000 par value, riskier student loans would sell at $950 to
increase the yield to compensate for the risk. This would result in a
loss of $50 to the federal government. Based on each school’s
proportional representation of the student loans in the security, each
school would be forced to contribute funds to compensate the federal
government for this loss. Like the previous risk sharing proposal in the
1990s, the institutions could be forced to cover only a portion of the
loss.288 There also could be mitigating factors such as local
unemployment rates, an institution’s status as a historically black
college, or income levels for the local area.289
Second, the federal government could interpret institutions as
being “originators” of the asset-backed-securities created from the
securitized student loans to trigger the risk retention requirements of
Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank requires originators of securitized assets to
retain a five percent ownership of those assets.290 For example, for a
$1,000 security, comprised of ten $100 loans from one institution, the
institution would be forced to own exposure to $50 of debt. As an
owner of the asset, the institution would receive a portion of loan
repayments like any other investor. Alternatively, it could either buy
the ownership from the Department at par value, $50, or buy an option
from a third party to cover the five percent interest of the securitized
asset in case of default. Assuming the option expense is similar to the
cost of the federal government guaranteeing an FFEL loan, it would
cost the institution roughly 15% of the loan’s value. In this example,
the cost would be around $7.50 (15% x $50) to buy an option to
guarantee the institution’s $50 portion of the security.291 Both of these
proposals would achieve the goal of creating market-based risk
287
288
289

290
291
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indicators for institutions. This risk exposure would help reduce any
losses from securitization and also provide a valuable quality of
education indicator to students, regulators, and accreditors.
2. Securitization Structures: Institutional Origination through
Perkins Loans & Pooling of Federal Assets with Cost
Sharing Provisions
There are two potential securitization structures for student loans,
both of which offer different incentives and complexities. First, the
Department could switch all of its student loan funding to Perkins
Loans, which are directly originated by the institutions. The
Department has recently sought to revitalize this program by making it
a mandatory credit program.292 Because the institutions originate the
loans, they already would bear the risk of repayment. This also would
provide a method to create a pilot program without overhauling most
financial aid programs. To provide liquidity, the Department could
purchase the loans through a program similar to ECASLA but pass any
losses from securitization back to the institutions. It would then pool
similar loans—either by school, major, or accreditation, as discussed
below—and sell them on the private market. Any losses on the public
sale would be shared with the schools.293 The federal government
could partially subsidize the loans by guaranteeing the loans at some
minimum level.294
Second, the Department can pool its directly owned loans for
securitization and require institutions to bear some or all of the risk
292
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from securitization. This could be implemented by requiring
institutions to agree to this cost sharing provision as a requirement for
access to Title IV funds.295 In this structure, the government would
pass the losses from securitization back to institutions. Using the
example of the $1000 security comprised of 10 loans, if the security
was sold for $990, then there would be a loss to the government of
$10.296 That loss would be distributed back to each loan
proportionally; in this example, that would translate to a cost of $1 per
loan. Requiring academic institutions to compensate the federal
government for losses could be enforced through the already-existing
Program Participation Agreement required for each institution.297
3. Pooling Options for Securitization
In order to properly align incentives to academic institutions, the
securitized loans need to be pooled in such a way as to provide clear
quality education indicators. If the Department pooled all the loans
together, there would be no way to distinguish quality programs and
academic institutions from poor ones. In order to create quality
indicators, the Department could pool loans by academic institution,
programmatic accreditation, or institutional accreditation.
Pooling loans by institutions would be the most effective means of
providing indicators through risk-based prices. This would be similar
to bond prices for university debt, and it would provide very clear
indicators for educational quality. Some universities, however, will not
graduate enough students per year to form a marketable security. For
example, the small liberal arts school of Centre College in Danville,
Kentucky, graduates roughly 350 students per year, and each graduate
has a total of roughly $22,000 in student loan debt.298 This would yield
around $7.7 million in assets to securitize annually, which is much too
small to be marketable to investors. While this method is ideal for
creating quality education indicators, securitization under this method
would be impracticable.
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Pooling loans by programmatic accreditation would isolate the
riskiness and quality of each academic program. This form of
securitization would encourage each academic program to change its
policies to achieve better loan repayment outcomes. The problem with
this approach, which is similar to Simkovic’s risk-based pricing,299 is
that it would unfairly penalize academic programs that do not
traditionally have high employment or salary rates—regardless of
quality. This type of risk segregation is likely to be too precise. For
example, medical school programs approved through the American
Medical Association would lead to higher priced securities because
there is less risk. Likewise, teaching programs accredited by the
National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education would yield
lower prices because the average salary would be less and because
employment rates are lower. This would limit an institution’s ability to
reform its programs so it would choose to either cut or expand
programs based on perceived risk of particular professions and not
based on the quality of the institution’s programs.
Pooling loans through institutional accreditation would provide the
largest group of loans for securitization and also would force
institutional reforms through accreditors. There are two types of
institutional accreditation, national and regional accreditation.300
National accreditors mainly accredit career and vocational institutions
or religiously-focused institutions, while regional accreditors accredit
the more traditional universities.301 The federal government may have
difficulty securitizing an accreditor such as the Transnational
Association of Christian Colleges and Schools because it is comprised
of only 55 schools with a combined enrollment of 17,000 students.302
However, most national and regional accreditors would be large
enough to form sustainable pools of loans for securitization.
To securitize by institutional accreditation, the Department would
combine all loans from institutions from the same institutional
accreditor and sell them on the open market as a security. Any loss
would be distributed back to institutions in proportion to the student
loan debt that institution contributed to the security. This would
encourage institutions to forum shop for accreditation from accreditors
299
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that are perceived as less risky. For example, the University of
Chicago may be less inclined to be accredited by The Higher Learning
Commission who also accredits online universities such as the
University of Phoenix.303 This would provide indirect incentives to
accreditors to improve their standards to achieve better repayment
outcomes for accredited institutions. A clear example of policy reform
would be accreditors requiring academic institutions to provide
academic counseling and career services to reduce the risk of bad
repayment outcomes.
All of these models could utilize credit tranches to make the loans
more marketable to risk-adverse investors. As part of this risk
retention policy, the Department could require the academic
institutions to own the riskiest tranches of the security. This would
allow institutions to bear the burden of reforming its policies and
programs to reduce its own costs. It also would make the securitized
loans more viable investments.
Considering the history of student loans, it would be prudent to
start this process through a pilot or demonstration program. This could
mirror the implementation of the Direct Loan Program in 1992, which
eventually became the exclusive federal student loan program in 2010.
The Department could use securitization as a method to gain liquidity
with the Direct Loan Program while also testing the viability of
market-based risk pricing mechanisms on a small scale. If successful,
the Department would have estimates of how much cost to pass onto
institutions for broader programs of securitization.
Another incentive structure for institutions to participate in the
pilot program would be for the Department to provide a conduit for
institutions to sell institution-owned Perkins Loans similar to the
ECASLA program. Institutions would be able to sell the Perkins Loans
to the Department on the condition that the institutions agree to share
some or all of the losses incurred through securitization of the loans.
Again, this would allow the Department to test the viability of selling
securitized loans on the private market on a small scale while also
determining the appropriate method of risk-sharing with institutions.
More interdisciplinary research is needed to test the viability of these
securitization concepts and potential pilot programs. The proposals
here are meant to encourage additional research to determine the best
303
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approach to reduce government risk and provide quality education
indicators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal financial aid is currently at risk of faltering because of
unrecognized accounting risks in the budget and balance sheet. This
inevitably will lead to some accounting reform, either through FCRA
reform or through agency changes in repayment and discount rate
estimates. History has shown that student loan reform primarily occurs
because of favorable treatment in the federal budget and balance sheet,
not because of bad student outcomes.304 Given this assumption, the
Department has an opportunity to introduce some form of loan
securitization to reduce risk exposure, capitalize loan assets to reduce
the budget costs, and introduce a new quality of education indicator to
postsecondary education by using market-based risk.
The recent Student Loan Certainty Act has laid the foundation for
the federal government to use market-based pricing with student loans
to reduce federal budget and balance sheet risks. The legislation also
demonstrates Congressional support for policies with short-term
upfront costs in exchange for long-term risk reduction to the federal
government. Academic institutions are the parties most capable of
bearing the market-risk from student loan repayment rates because
students have asymmetrical information and the federal government
cannot regulate the quality of education. Furthermore, academic
institutions and accrediting agencies are best able to respond
effectively to securitization incentives through academic advising,
choice of programs, and curriculum. While not a panacea,
securitization provides a policy mechanism to reform our current
student loan programs and create a new quality education indicator.
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